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Abstract
This paper extends the theory of the core, the uncovered set, and the related undominated
set to a general set of alternatives and an arbitrary measure space of voters. We investigate
the properties of social preferences generated by simple games, we extend results on generic
emptiness of the core, we prove the general nonemptiness of the uncovered and undominated
sets, and we prove the upper hemicontinuity of these correspondences when the voters'
preferences are such that the core is nonempty and externally stable. Finally, we give
conditions under which the undominated set is lower hemicontinuous.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Downs (1957), followed by Davis and Hinich's (1966) introduction
of the mathematics of Euclidean preferences, by Plott's (1967) investigation of symmetry
conditions for core points, and by Kramer's (1972) adaptation of Farquharson's (1969)
analysis of strategic voting in committees, the spatial theory of elections and committees
has occupied a prominent theoretical status in the analysis of political decision-making. As
pointed out by Ordeshook (1993), \The idea of spatial preferences, of representing the set
of feasible alternatives as a subset of an m-dimensional Euclidean space, of labelling the
dimensions `issues,' of assuming that people (legislators or voters) have an ideal policy on
each issue, and of supposing that each person's preference (utility) decreases as we move
away from his or her m-dimensional ideal policy, is now commonplace and broadly accepted
as a legitimate basis for modelling electorates and parliaments." The classical approach
takes as given the set of alternatives and voter preferences over alternatives and models the
decisions of coalitions of voters in terms of a dominance, or \social preference," relation
that captures the incentives of groups to form and move from one alternative to another.
This relation must re°ect not only voter preferences, but also institutional features that
may favor some groups over others, such as voting rights laws, laws governing campaign
contributions, or the partitioning of voters into districts. Thus, implicit in this level of
abstraction is the assumption that it is not necessary to model the precise details of such
political institutions.
The maximal elements of the dominance relation, known as the \core," occupy the
special position of being weakly socially preferred to all other alternatives, but it is well
known that the majority core may be empty. Indeed, building on the work of Plott (1967),
a number of authors have established that emptiness of the core is a generic property in
multidimensional settings, where \generic" is de¯ned formally in various ways.1 Further-
more, McKelvey's (1976,1979) \chaos" results showed that emptiness of the core typically
leads to a social preference cycle throughout the space of alternatives. Some scholars (e.g.,
Riker (1980)) have concluded that political decisions represent arbitrary outcomes highly
dependent upon the speci¯c details of the particular institutions under consideration, and,
therefore, that a general theory of political decision-making is impossible. This point of view
has been challenged by others searching for \institution-free" properties of social choice to
provide bounds on equilibrium predictions and to circumscribe the extent of instability.
The problem, abstractly formulated, is to construct a compelling theory of choice that is
consistent with maximality when the core is nonempty but yields nonempty choice sets even
when the core does not.
In that vein of research, the notion of the uncovered set is central. The uncovered set was
de¯ned originally by Fishburn (1977) and Miller (1980) and axiomatized by Moulin (1986)
in the context of tournaments, i.e., majority preferences over a ¯nite set of alternatives
1These include Rubinstein (1979), Scho e¯ld (1983), Cox (1984), Le Breton (1987), Banks (1995), and
Saari (1997).
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with no ties.2 In that setting, one of several equivalent de¯nitions of the uncovered set is
as follows: an alternative x belongs to the uncovered set if and only if, for every alternative
z, there is some y such that x is socially preferred to y, which is socially preferred to z.
The comparison with the core is clear: rather than requiring that x be directly preferred to
every other alternative, we allow it to be indirectly preferred in two steps. The uncovered
set can be viewed as the maximal elements of a transitive \covering relation," and it follows
immediately that the uncovered set is nonempty when the set of alternatives is ¯nite. In the
corresponding model of two-party electoral competition, based on Downs (1957), it is well
known that a pair of policy positions form a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if the
parties both locate at majority core points. Fisher and Ryan (1991) and La®ond, Laslier,
and Le Breton (1993) independently proved that the Downsian electoral game generally
has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium and that the support of the parties' strategies
lies in the uncovered set. In the context of weak tournaments, where majority ties are
allowed, distinctions emerge between previously equivalent de¯nitions of the uncovered set.
We focus on the uncovered set as de¯ned by McKelvey (1986) and several later authors,3
and on the smaller \undominated set." While the undominated set is too small to bound
mixed strategy equilibria in the Downsian electoral game, Dutta and Laslier (1999) show
that the uncovered set still contains the support of all equilibrium mixed strategies.
Shepsle and Weingast (1984) and McKelvey (1986) were the ¯rst to consider the un-
covered set in the standard spatial model, where policy alternatives are modelled as points
in a convex subset of Euclidean space and majority preferences over social policies are de-
termined by the continuous, strictly convex preferences of a ¯nite electorate. Under these
assumptions, the covering relation is still transitive, but its continuity properties are poor.
Nevertheless, McKelvey demonstrates that the uncovered set (indeed, the undominated set
too) is nonempty and, under the more speci¯c assumptions that the number of voters is
odd and that preferences are Euclidean, he shows that this set lies in a centrally located
region of the policy space, one that collapses to the core as voter preferences are aligned
to make the core nonempty. This result is generalized by Cox (1987) to strictly convex
voter preferences with \limited asymmetry." The precise calculation of the uncovered set,
or, more modestly, the search for bounds sharpening those discovered by McKelvey in some
speci¯c situations, is the subject of Feld, Grofman, Hartley, Kilgour, and Miller (1987) and
Hartley and Kilgour (1987). A more general result on the nonemptiness of the uncovered
set is derived by Bordes, Le Breton, and Salles (1992), with a yet more general result proved
by Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton (2002). An important conclusion of McKelvey's (1986)
is that the uncovered set bounds equilibrium outcomes in several di®erent institutional set-
tings, including sophisticated voting outcomes for a class of binary trees and mixed strategy
equilibria of Downsian electoral competition between two parties. His claim for the latter
setting is formally proved and extended by Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton (2002).
The main objective of this paper is to contribute further to this research program by
2See Laslier (1997) for a comprehensive reference on tournaments.
3See Dutta and Laslier (1999), Peris and Subiza (1999), Duggan and Le Breton (2001), and Banks,
Duggan and Le Breton (2002).
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developing the theory of the core, the uncovered set, and the undominated set in very general
environments. We begin in an abstract choice theory setting with a topological space of
alternatives and an arbitrary preference relation; we establish weak su±cient conditions
for nonemptiness of the uncovered set and the smaller undominated set; and we examine
other properties of these sets, such as external stability and the possibility of a \two-step"
principle. We then explicitly model an electorate as a measure space of voters and a pro¯le
of preferences assigning each voter a continuous weak order on the space of alternatives.
Thus, we discard the usual assumptions on the set of alternatives and voter preferences and
instead impose general topological conditions on these primitives, allowing us to capture, for
example, the choice of an income tax function or the choice of a probability measure over an
in¯nite set. In doing so, we unify the cases of a ¯nite set and a convex subset of Euclidean
space, previously treated only separately. Further, by dropping the common assumption
of strictly convex preferences, we capture a number of common models in economics and
political science: we obtain as special cases private good, and mixed economies, with or
without production, as well as the \divide-the-dollar" model, where voters must allocate a
¯xed amount of a resource among themselves and care only about their own consumption.4
Thus, our results shed some light on the analyses of Epstein (1998) and Penn (2002), who
consider the uncovered set in divide-the-dollar environments.
Our assumption of an arbitrary measure space of voters captures a ¯nite electorate and
a continuous distribution of voters as special cases. For example, in the spatial model with
preferences parameterized by \ideal points," say in <m, we may describe the electorate
either by a ¯nite number of points in <m, as in the simplest model, or by a density with
respect to the Lebesgue measure. In the context of an exchange economy, we may assume a
¯nite number of consumers or, as in Hildenbrand (1974), allow for arbitrary distributions of
preferences over net consumption bundles. In fact, though empirical preference distributions
are discrete, a substantial literature on voting models them as continuous. For example,
Downs (1957) and Tullock (1967) have discussed, in very unformalized terms, the existence
of equilibria for continuous voter distributions. In the Euclidean setting, Davis, Degroot,
and Hinich (1972) allowed for a continuum of voters and found that the existence of majority
equilibrium was equivalent to the existence of a total median in the distribution of ideal
points. Kramer (1978) and Duggan (2002) prove the existence of mixed strategy Nash
equilibria in the multidimensional Downsian model, assuming a continuous distribution of
voters and vote maximizing parties. McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Ungar (1980) have extended
Plott's necessary symmetry condition for core points to the case of a measure space of voters.
Myerson (1993) examines Nash equilibria in electoral competition between parties that must
compete for votes by, essentially, dividing a dollar across a continuous electorate.
There are several reasons why it is desirable to model electorates at this level of general-
ity. First, regularity conditions across voter preferences may be more easily formalized and
analyzed. This type of concern is evident in the work of Grandmont (1978) on intermediate
4In these environments, an agent's preferences may be strictly convex in his own consumption but not in
others'. Since an alternative must specify the consumption of all consumers, strict convexity is not satis¯ed.
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preferences and in the work of Caplin and Nalebu® (1988), who have shown in the Euclidean
setting that, if a continuous voter distribution is described by a log-concave density and
we increase the majority quota to 64% or more, then there exists an undefeated policy.
Second, the continuous setting is an important step toward our understanding of ¯nite but
large electorates. When we deal with a ¯nite electorate, we do not usually explain how the
diversity of preferences among the electorate is generated, i.e., we simply consider as given
a ¯nite list of points in the relevant space of preferences. But suppose that the ¯nite list
of preferences in the electorate is a sample of independent draws from an underlying con-
tinuous distribution on preferences. Then, if the electorate is large, the Glivenko-Cantelli
Theorem implies that the continuous distribution is a good \approximation" of the ¯nite
one. Consequently, if continuity results can be established on some sets, e.g., the uncovered
set, then the sets de¯ned for the limit distribution will \approximate" the sets for large,
¯nite electorates. Third, if elections, rather than committees, are the main object of study,
then it is desirable that results not be too sensitive to speci¯c assumptions about whether
the number of voters is odd or even. This means that adding or deleting one voter should
not matter, so that each voter is massless, which leads us to the continuum model. Finally,
in case alternatives are ultimately chosen as the result of Downsian competition between
two parties, we have existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in models with a continuum of
voters, as in Kramer (1978), whereas the problem of existence remains unsolved for ¯nite
electorates: the presence of a continuum of voters helps to \smooth out" the parties' payo®s,
eliminating certain discontinuities that are extremely problematic in the ¯nite case.5
While the above authors consider majority rule only or restrict attention to anonymous
voting rules, we build on the concept of a simple game to describe the distribution of power in
a large electorate. Our de¯nition extends Shapley's (1962) notion of simple game, de¯ned for
a ¯nite set of players, to a measure space of voters, but we add the restriction that measure
zero sets of voters \don't count," an intuitive idea in a model of political decision-making
in a democratic society. We explore the implications of this new structure, and we de¯ne
several new continuity properties of simple games that generalize majority rule and play an
important role subsequently. We then analyze the continuity properties of social preferences
induced by simple games. Notably, we introduce a dispersion condition on voter preferences
that plays a role analogous to the role played by oddness in the ¯nite context. Finally,
we consider the core, the uncovered set, and the undominated set generated by arbitrary
electorates. We ¯rst prove the generic emptiness of the core, extending earlier results for
¯nite electorates, and we then exploit our choice-theoretic results on the uncovered set and
undominated set. We show, for example, that if voters have continuous preferences with
compact upper sections, and if the simple game satis¯es a minimal continuity property,
then the uncovered set is nonempty. We also establish, under slightly stronger conditions
involving the lower hemicontinuity of upper sections of the social preference relation, the
nonemptiness of the undominated set. We show that these sets are upper hemicontinuous
at preference pro¯les where the core is nonempty and externally stable, generalizing Cox's
5See Duggan (2002) for an analysis of this case.
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(1987) continuity result. Finally, we give conditions under which the undominated set
is lower hemicontinuous, a key condition for the existence of continuous selections, via
Michael's Selection Theorem.
Returning to the Downsian electoral model, a policy position is not weakly dominated
for a party if and only if it lies in the undominated set, so our result on nonemptiness
of the undominated set implies the existence of undominated strategies for the parties,
despite the substantial discontinuities in the parties' payo® functions. An implication of
our result on the generic emptiness of the core, however, is that, even with a continuum
of voters, almost all assignments of preferences to voters lead to the non-existence of pure
strategy equilibrium. If there is a mixed strategy equilibrium with probability-of-winning
maximizing parties, then Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton (2002) show that the support of
all such mixed strategy equilibria must lie in the uncovered set. Our continuity results then
have the following implications. Suppose that there is a continuum of voters, and consider
a preference pro¯le for which the core is nonempty and externally stable. For example, in
the Euclidean setting, suppose voter ideal points are distributed according to a symmetric
density function. There is then a pure strategy equilibrium, the unique core point, which
coincides with the undominated set and uncovered set. Now perturb the distribution of
ideal points to violate symmetry, so that the core is empty and pure strategy equilibria no
longer exist. By upper hemicontinuity, the uncovered set cannot expand discontinuously to
contain points far away from the core of the original pro¯le, and, since the undominated
strategies form a subset of the uncovered set, the same is true for them. Mixed strategy
equilibria, if any, will have supports contained in the uncovered set, and it follows that these
equilibrium strategies must put probability close to one on points nearby the pure strategy
equilibria of the original game. Thus, we obtain a robustness result for Downsian elections.
Furthermore, our upper hemicontinuity result can be applied to investigate the proper-
ties of the uncovered set for large but ¯nite electorates. Suppose, for example, that the set
of alternatives is multidimenssional and voter preferences are Euclidean. If we randomly
draw voter ideal points from a given symmetric density function, then with probability one
the core will be empty after any ¯nite number of draws, but our result can be used to show
that the uncovered sets of these ¯nite electorates, and therefore the undominated strategies
and the mixed strategy equilibrium outcomes of Downsian competition, converge to the core
of the underlying symmetric distribution. By the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem, the empirical
distribution of preferences in the ¯nite electorates will approximate the symmetric density
with probability one. We can then construct a continuum of voters and de¯ne a sequence of
preferences re°ecting the empirical distributions after each draw. Since the preferences of
these electorates approximate the underlying symmetric distribution, this argument shows
that the corresponding uncovered sets must become arbitrarily close to the core of the
underlying distribution. Thus, we con¯rm an old conjecture by Nicholas Miller that the
uncovered set collapses to a centrally located area as the number of voters increases.6
6See Shepsle and Weingast's (1984) footnote 15. This result is also related to work on convergence of the
yolk by Feld, Grofman, and Miller (1988) and Tovey (1992) in the spatial model with Euclidean preferences.
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The problems we take up in this paper are quite di®erent from another literature on
social choice with in¯nite electorates, which takes an axiomatic approach in the spirit of
Arrow (1963). Fishburn (1970), Kirman and Sondermann (1972), and Armstrong (1980),
for example, extend Arrow's Theorem to in¯nite sets of voters without the added structure
of a measure on the set of voters. Recently, Gomberg, Martinelli, and Torres (2002) and
Fey (2002) have considered the implications of anonymity for a measure space of voters.
These authors begin with axioms on aggregation rules de¯ned on a domain of preferences
and characterize the rules satisfying these axioms. In contrast, we begin with a restricted
class of aggregations rules, and we deduce properties of social preferences generated by a
¯xed pro¯le of preferences or we deduce properties of certain sets of preference pro¯les.
In Section 2, we analyze the core, uncovered set, and undominated set in the abstract
choice theory setting. In Section 3, we introduce a measure space of voters and de¯ne our
concept of a simple game. In Section 4, we examine the properties of social preferences
derived from an electorate. In Section 5, we present our genericity and continuity results on
the core, uncovered set, and undominated set. An appendix contains a general analysis of
binary relations, proofs of lemmas, and some proofs of propositions omitted from the text.
2 Choice Sets
We consider an abstract setting in this section, letting P be a strict preference relation and
R a weak preference relation over a topological space A of alternatives. When we discuss
the case of ¯nite A, we will always assume the discrete topology. We assume here that P is
irre°exive, that R is re°exive, and that the relations are dual: aRb if and only if not bPa.
Note that P is asymmetric if and only if R is complete, in which case P is the asymmetric
part of R.7 We say P is a tournament if it is also connected, in the sense that a6= b implies
aP b or bPa. Given an arbitrary relation Q on A, we denote by Q(a) the set fb 2 A : bQag
and by Q¡1(a) the set fb 2 A : aQbg. An alternative a is Q-maximal if, for all b 2 A, bQa
implies aQb. If Q is asymmetric, this is equivalent to Q(a) = ;. If Q is complete, this is
equivalent to Q¡1(a) = X. For now, we abstract from the details of P , R, and A, though
later A will be given the interpretation of a policy space and P and R will represent social
preferences, derived from an explicit collection of \winning coalitions."
A central concept in what follows is the core, de¯ned as the set of P -maximal alterna-
tives:
K = fa 2 A : P(a) = ;g:
Thus, an alternative lies in the core if and only if it is weakly preferred to every alternative.
We de¯ne the dominance relation, denoted D, as follows: aDb if and only if P (a) µ P(b)
and R(a) µ R(b), at least one inclusion strict. The undominated set of P consists of the
7The conditions of asymmetry and completeness are standard, but they are only used for two results at
the end of this section. We state our other results without those conditions, to maximize their generality.
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D-maximal alternatives:
UD = fa 2 A : D(a) = ;g:
De¯ne the covering relation, denoted C , as follows: aCb if and only if aPb, P(a) µ P(b),
and R(a) µ R(b). Equivalently, aCb if and only if aPb and aDb. The uncovered set of P
consists of the C-maximal alternatives:
UC = fa 2 A : C(a) = ;g:
It is clear from these de¯nitions that the covering and dominance relations are asymmetric
and transitive, and that K [UD µ UC.8
The next proposition gives a condition on preferences su±cient for external stability of
the core and for the nesting of these sets. This condition, that R(a) = P(a)[fag for every
alternative, formalizes the idea that the \indi®erence curve" through a is \thin": if P(a) is
open, then the condition implies that I(a) is nowhere dense. We append the singleton fag
to P (a) to capture the case in which A is ¯nite and P is a tournament. Given a set X, X
denotes the closure of X .
Proposition 1 Assume R(a) = P(a)[fag for all a 2 A. For all a 2 K and all b 2 Anfag,
aP b. In particular, K is empty or singleton, and K µ UD µ UC.
Proof: Take any a 2 K and any distinct b 2 A. If not aPb, then b 2 R(a) = P (a) [ fag.
Since b 6= a, P(a) 6= ;, contradicting a 2 K. Thus, K cannot contain more than one
element. If a 2 K and bDa for some b 2 A, then b 2 R(a) = P(a) [ fag. Since D is
asymmetric, b6= a, and we again arrive at a contradiction. Thus, K µ UD.
Though K can be empty in the absence of acyclicity or semi-convexity of P , asymmetry
and transitivity of C and D immediately imply nonemptiness of the sets UD and UC when
A is ¯nite. Our general results on nonemptiness and external stability of the above sets
follow from the analysis of maximal elements in the appendix.
Proposition 2 Assume R(a) is compact for some a 2 A, and R(b) is closed for all b 2 A.
Then UC6= ;.
The nonemptiness of the undominated set is obtained under stronger assumptions on
preferences.
Proposition 3 Assume R(a) is compact for some a 2 A, R(b) is closed for all b 2 A, and
R(¢) is lower hemicontinuous as a correspondence. Then UD6= ;.
8Some authors de¯ne covering without P (a) µ P(b), and others drop R(a) µ R(b). We show that, in
some environments, these omissions are inconsequential. In general, however, both inclusions are needed to
maintain the connections between covering and dominance.
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We now establish that, under the assumptions of Proposition 3, the undominated set is
externally stable.
Proposition 4 Assume R(a) is compact for all a 2 A and R(¢) is lower hemicontinuous
as a correspondence. If a =2UD, then there exists b 2UD such that bDa.
Under the same assumptions, the external stability of the uncovered set is also obtained.
Proposition 5 If R(a) is compact for all a 2 A, if R(¢) is lower hemicontinuous as a
correspondence, and if a =2 UC, then there exists b 2 UC such that bCa
Proof: Let c 2 A be such that cCa. If c is undominated, then it is uncovered and the
claim is proved. If c is dominated, then, by Proposition 4, there is some undominated,
hence uncovered, b such that bDc. Then bDcCa implies bCa.
We next give conditions that can be used to simplify the de¯nitions of the dominance
and covering relations. The next lemma, which generalizes Shepsle and Weingast's (1984)
Lemma 1, does the bulk of the work for us. Given a set X, X± denotes the interior of X.
Lemma 1
1. If R(a) = P(a) [ fag and R(b) = P(b) [ fbg, then P(a)µ P(b) implies R(a) µR(b).
2. If P (a) [ fag=R(a)± [ fag and P(b) [ fbg=R(b)± [fbg, then R(a) µR(b) implies
P(a)µ P(b).
Before continuing, we note an alternative formulation of the condition in the second
part of Lemma 1. It is used in several results to follow.
Lemma 2 Assume A is Hausdor®. Then P(a) [ fag = R(a)± [ fag for all a 2 A if and
only if R¡1(a) = P¡1(a) [ fag for all a 2A.
We now consider some equivalent formulations of the covering and dominance relations.
A version of the following result can be found in McKelvey's (1986) Proposition 3.3, where
he imposes conditions on voter preferences and the voting rule to induce the properties
required of social preferences: he claims that, under his conditions, the four equivalences
stated in Proposition 6 hold. His assumptions are indeed su±cient for thin indi®erence
curves, i.e., R(a) = P (a)[fag, used in part 1 of Proposition 6, and so the two equivalences
there do hold in his model. McKelvey's proof implicitly relies, however, on the condition
used in part 2 of the Proposition 6, i.e., R¡1(a) = P¡1(a) [ fag, and that condition is not
necessarily satis¯ed under his assumptions: it will hold if the set A of alternatives is an
open subset of <n, but not generally. The condition is crucial: without it, the implication
aPb and R(a) µR(b) ) aCb
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may fail. In Section 4, we give two examples of social choice environments, including the
divide-the-dollar environment, where this failure occurs. Thus, the violation of our condition
necessitates care in the de¯nition of covering and raises the possibility, noted by Penn (2002)
in the divide-the-dollar model, of multiple \uncovered sets." Note that the conditions of
our proposition hold if A is ¯nite and P is a tournament, though of course the equivalences
are well-known in that environment.
Proposition 6
1. If R(a) = P(a) [ fag for all a 2 A, then
aCb , aP b and P (a) µ P (b)
aDb , P(a) ½½ P(b):
2. Assume A is Hausdor®. If R¡1(a) = P¡1(a) [ fag for all a 2A, then
aCb , aPb and R(a) µR(b)
aDb , R(a) ½½ R(b):
Proof: To prove the ¯rst part of the proposition, suppose R(a) = P(a)[fag for all a 2 A.
Clearly, aCb implies aPb andP (a) µ P (b). For the opposite direction, note that, by Lemma
1, P(a) µ P (b) implies R(a) µ R(b), as required. Clearly, aDb implies P(a) µ P (b). If this
inclusion is not strict, then P(a) = P(b), and Lemma 1 impliesR(a) = R(b), a contradiction.
Therefore,P (a) ½½ P (b). For the opposite direction, note that, by Lemma 1, P(a) ½½ P(b)
implies R(a) µR(b).
To prove the second part of the proposition, suppose R¡1(a) = P¡1(a) [ fag for all
a 2 A. By Lemma 2, we have P(a) [ fag=R(a)± [ fag for all a 2A. Clearly, aCb implies
aP b and R(a) µ R(b). For the opposite direction, note that, by Lemma 1, R(a) µ R(b)
implies P(a) µ P (b), as required. Clearly, aDb implies R(a) µ R(b). If this inclusion is not
strict, then R(a) = R(b), and Lemma 1 implies P(a) = P(b), a contradiction. Therefore,
R(a) ½½ R(b). For the opposite direction, note that, by Lemma 1, R(a) ½½ R(b) implies
P(a) µ P (b).
We end this section by considering the possibility of deriving a version of the \two-step"
principle (Miller (1980)) in our abstract setting. We ¯rst prove a simple lemma, a version
of which can be found in McKelvey's (1986) Proposition 3.4.9 For a binary relation Q on
A, we denote by Q2(a) the set Q(a) [ fb 2 A : 9c 2A; bQcQag.
9Part 1 of Lemma 3 generalizes Shepsle and Weingast's (1984) lemma 2(b); part 2 of Lemma 3 generalizes
their Lemma 5; and part 3 of Lemma 3 generalizes their Lemma 2(a). In the latter result, however, the
authors omit the antecedent condition of part 3, which, as we show in Section 4, is needed for the result.
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Lemma 3 Assume R is complete and P is asymmetric.
1. If a 2 P2(b), then P(b)6µ P (a) and R(b)6µR(a).
2. If P (b)6µ P (a) or R(b)6µR(a), then a 2 R2(b).
3. If R¡1(a) = P¡1(a)[ fag for all a 2A, then a 2 P2(b) if and only if P (b)6µ P(a).
4. If R(a) = P(a) [ fag for all a 2 A, then a 2 P2(b) if and only if R(b)6µR(a).
We now state a form of the two-step principle. The ¯rst part of Proposition 7 is as
in Shepsle and Weingast's (1984) Proposition 2 and McKelvey's (1986) Proposition 4.1.
In the latter paper, however, McKelvey also states that UC is contained in the closure ofT
a2A(P2(a)[fag),10 but his proof contains an error,11 and we have not been able to verify
the result. Thus, the size of the gap between the uncovered and undominated sets, despite
the similarities in their de¯nitions, remains open. The next result does establish, under a
richness condition on the strict preference relation, a strong version of the two-step property
for the undominated set: given any undominated alternative a and any other b, either a
is strictly preferred to b, or it is strictly preferred to some alternative that is itself strictly
preferred to b.
Proposition 7 Assume R is complete and P is asymmetric.
1.
T
a2A(P 2(a) [ fag) µ UD µ UC µ
T
a2AR2(a).
2. Assume R¡1(a) = P¡1(a) [fag and R(a) = P(a)[ fag for all a 2 A, and P is open.
If a 2 UD and b =2 UD, then a 2 P2(b). If a 2 UC and b =2 UC, then a 2 P 2(b).
3. In addition, assume that P(a) = P (b) implies a= b for all a;b 2A. If a 2 UD, then,
for all b 2 A n fag, a 2 P2(b).
Proof: That
T
a2A(P 2(a) [ fag) µ UD follows from the ¯rst part of Lemma 3. That
UC µ Ta2AR2(a) follows from the second part of Lemma 3. To prove the second part of
the proposition, take a 2 UD and b =2 UD. Let cDb. Since not cDa, either P(c) 6µ P(a),
or R(c) 6µ R(a), or both P(c) = P(a) and R(c) = R(a). In the ¯rst two cases, the third
and fourth parts of Lemma 3 yield a 2 P 2(c) and, therefore, a 2 P2(b). In the last case,
aDb, and at least one of P(a) µ P (b) and R(a) µR(b) holds strictly, and Lemma 3 again
implies a 2 P 2(b). Now take a 2 UC and b =2 UC . Let cCb. Since not cCa, there are four
possible cases: the three above, which proceed as before, and aRc. If a = c, then, since
cPb, we are done. If a6= c, there exists d 2 P¡1(a) \P(b), as in the proof of the third part
of Lemma 3. To prove the third part of the proposition, take a 2 UD and b 6= a. Then
either P(b)6µ P (a) or R(b)6µ R(a), both implying a 2 P 2(b), or P(b) = P(b), which implies
a= b, a contradiction.
10After correcting a typo: the set
T
a2A P
2(a) considered by McKelvey is necessarily empty, by asymmetry
of P . Shepsle and Weingast consider the same set.
11In the last line on p.309, McKelvey claims that \
T
y2X P 2(y) µ
T
y2X P2(y)," which need not hold.
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3 Electorates
The purpose of this section is to introduce a general framework, describing an electorate
as a measurable mapping from an abstract set of voters into the set of continuous weak
orderings of alternative. The framework is general enough to accommodate a ¯nite number
or a continuous distribution of voters. An electorate consists of a probability space (-;§;¸),
where - is a set of voters (or voter \types"), § a¾-algebra on -, and ¸ a probability measure,
together with a preference pro¯le ½, formalized as follows. Let A denote a topological
space of alternatives, and let R denote the set of closed weak orders on A (complete,
transitive relations, closed in A £ A), endowed with the topology of closed convergence
(Hildenbrand (1974)). Endowing R with the Borel ¾-algebra, a pro¯le is a measurable
mapping ½:-!R, where ½(!) is the weak preference relation of voter !. Let ¼(!) denote
the asymmetric part of ½(!), the strict preference relation of voter !. If A is a Hausdor®,
locally compact space, then, given any a;b 2 A, the set fR 2 R : aRbg is closed in the
topology of closed convergence, and, since ½ is measurable, the coalitions f! 2 - : a½(!)bg
and f! 2 - : a¼(!)bg are §-measurable. If - is a topological space, in which case we
assume that § consists of the Borel sets, and if ½ is continuous, then these sets are closed
and open, respectively. Except for the regularity imposed by measurability, the notion of
electorate is simply the direct extension of the notion of pro¯le used when there is a ¯nite
number of voters.
We now turn to our formal representation of the distribution of power in the electorate,
a concept that underlies our analysis of social preferences in the next section.
De¯nition 1 A simple game is a collection W µ § of coalitions such that ; =2 W, - 2 W,
and, for all S 2 W and all T 2 §, ¸(S n T) = 0 implies T 2 W.
The coalitions in W are winning coalitions. Note that, by our de¯nition, winning coali-
tions can be thought of as equivalence classes: two sets that di®er only on a set of ¸-measure
zero have the same status as winning or not winning. An implication is that the collection
of winning coalitions cannot be de¯ned without reference to the distribution of voter types.
Furthermore, we incorporate a monotonicity condition into our de¯nition: if S 2 W and
T 2 § satis¯ es S µ T , then T 2 W. We say a coalition S is blocking for W if its comple-
ment is not winning, and, letting Xc denote the complement of a set X, we let B denote the
collection of blocking coalitions, i.e., B = fS 2 § : Sc =2 Wg. Note that B is itself a simple
game, and thatW and B are dual, in the sense that W consists of the coalitions blocking
for B.
The following properties of simple games will be used in the sequel.
De¯nition 2 A simple game W satis¯es the following conditions if it possesses the corre-
sponding properties.
1. proper: W µ B.
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2. open from below: for all sequences fSng in § and all S 2 W, if Sn " S, then there
exists m such that, for all n ¸m, Sn 2 W.
3. closed from above: for all sequences fSng inW and all S 2 §, if Sn # S, then S 2 W.
4. liminf-open: for all sequences fSng in § with lim inf Sn 2 W, there exists m such
that, for all n ¸m, Sn 2 W.
5. limsup-closed: for all sequences fSng in W, lim supSn 2 W.
6. ¸-open: for all S 2 W, there exists ² > 0 such that, for all T 2 §, if ¸(S n T) · ²,
then T 2 W.
7. ¸-closed: for all S 2 §, if for all ² > 0 there exists T 2 W such that ¸(T n S) < ²,
then S 2 W.
8. anonymous: for all S 2 W and all T 2 §, if ¸(T) = ¸(S) then T 2 W.
9. semi-strong: for all S 2 B and all T 2 §, if S µ T and ¸(T n S) > 0, then T 2 W.
10. strong: B µW.
Note thatW is proper if and only if S;T 2 W implies ¸(S \ T ) > 0. The next propo-
sition establishes some connections between continuity properties of winning and blocking
coalitions. Note that, by duality, the proposition implies thatW is closed from above if and
only if B is open from below, with similar dual results for liminf-open and limsup-closed
simple games and for ¸-open and ¸-closed simple games.
Proposition 8
1. W is open from below if and only if B is closed from above.
2. W is liminf-open if and only if B is limsup-closed.
3. W is ¸-open if and only if B is ¸-closed.
Proof: To prove the ¯rst part of the proposition, note that W is open from below if and
only if, for all sequences fSng in § and all S 2 W, Sn " S implies there exists m such that,
for all n ¸ m, Sn 2 W. Equivalently: if Sn " S and there is some subsequence of fSng
(also indexed by n) such that, for all n, Sn =2W, then S =2 W. Equivalently: if Scn # Sc and
there is some subsequence of fScng such that, for all n, Scn 2 B, then Sc 2 B. And the latter
means that B is closed from above.
To prove the second part, note thatW is liminf-open if and only if, for all sequences fSng
in § with lim inf Sn 2 W, there exists m such that, for all n ¸ m, Sn 2 W. Equivalently:
if there is some subsequence of fSng (also indexed by n) such that, for all n, Sn =2 W, then
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liminf Sn =2 W. Equivalently: if there is some subsequence such that, for all n, Scn 2 B,
then limsupScn = (lim inf Sn)
c 2 B. And the latter means that B is limsup-closed.
To prove the third part, note that W is ¸-open if and only if, for all S 2 § with
S =2 W, there exists ² > 0 such that, for all T 2 W, we have ¸(T n S) ¸ ². Equivalently:
for all S 2 B, there exists ² > 0 such that, for all T 2 W, we have ¸(T n Sc) ¸ ².
Equivalently: for all S 2 B, there exists ² > 0 such that, ¸(T n Sc) < ² implies T =2 W.
Using T n Sc = T \ S = S nT c, this is equivalent to: for all S 2 B, there exists ² > 0 such
that, ¸(S n T) < ² implies T 2 B. And this means that B is ¸-closed.
If - is ¯nite, then every simple game is clearly ¸-open, liminf-open, open from below,
¸-closed, limsup-closed, and closed from above. The next proposition illustrates a general
nesting of the ¯rst three of these concepts. By duality, of course, the next proposition
immediately implies that, if B is ¸-closed, then it is limsup-closed; and if B is limsup-closed,
then it is closed from above.
Proposition 9
1. IfW is ¸-open, then it is liminf-open.
2. IfW is liminf-open, then it is open from below.
Proof: SupposeW is ¸-open, and take a sequence fSng in § such that lim inf Sn 2 W, i.e.,S1
n=1
T1
k=n Sn 2 W. Letting Tn =
T1
k=n Sn and T =
S1
n=1 Tn, we have Tn " T, implying
T nTn # ;. Therefore, ¸(T n Tn)! 0. If W is ¸-continuous, there exists m such that, for
all n ¸m, Tn 2W. Then, since Tn µ Sn, Sn 2 W for all n ¸m, as required.
Now suppose W is liminf-open, and take a sequence fSng in § and S 2 § such that
Sn " S. Clearly, S = liminf Sn, so there exists m such that, for all n ¸ m, Sn 2 W, as
required.
The next proposition establishes an implication of openness from below when voters
are continuously distributed, namely, that we cannot have the collections of winning and
blocking coalitions both open from below. Note the immediate implication, with Proposition
9, that W and B cannot both be liminf-open or ¸-open. By duality, these simple games
cannot both be closed from above, limsup-closed, or ¸-closed. The result also illustrates the
restrictiveness ofW being proper and strong: if both conditions hold, then W = B, so that
W cannot be open from below. Though these conditions are relatively innocuous in ¯nite
electorates, in continuous electorates they are inconsistent with a basic continuity property
of simple games.
Proposition 10 Assume ¸ is non-atomic. If W is open from below, then B is not open
from below.
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Proof: AssumeW is open from below, and suppose B is also open from below. Let S1 2 W.
Since W is open from below and ¸ is non-atomic,
E1 = f² > 0 : 9T 2 W : T µ S1; ¸(S1 n T )¸ ²g
is nonempty. Let ²1 = supE1 > 0, and take S2 2 W such that S2 µ S1 and ¸(S1nS2)¸ ²1=2.
Since W is open from below and ¸ is non-atomic,
E2 = f² > 0 : 9T 2 W : T µ S2; ¸(S2 n T )¸ ²g
is nonempty. Let ²2 = supE2 > 0, and take S3 2 W such that S3 µ S2 and ¸(S2nS3)¸ ²2=2,
and so on. Note that ²n ! 0. De¯ne S = T1n=1 Sn. If S =2 W, then Sc 2 B, and, because
B is open from below, we have Scn 2 B for high enough n, contradicting Sn 2 W. Thus,
S 2 W. Note that ¸(S) > 0, for otherwise ; 2 W. But then there exists T 2 § such
that T µ S and ¸(S n T) > 0. Take n high enough that ²n < ¸(S n T), and note that
¸(Sn n T ) ¸ ¸(S n T ) > ²n, a contradiction. Therefore, B is not open from below, as
claimed.
IfW is open from below and anonymous, then it is easy to see that it is simply de¯ned
by a quota q 2 [0;1], as follows:
S 2 W if and only if ¸(S) > q;
where q ¸ 1=2 if W is proper. In fact, all quota rules of this form are actually ¸-open.
Majority rule, which is the special case with quota q = 1=2 (i.e., W = fS 2 § : ¸(S) >
1=2g), is always semi-strong: if S 2 B, then ¸(S) ¸ 1=2; then S µ T and ¸(TnS) > 0 implies
¸(T) > 1=2, i.e., T 2 W. Of course, strong implies semi-strong. That the implication is
strict can be seen in the important case of - ¯nite: majority rule is semi-strong but is not
always strong, e.g., when ¸ is the uniform measure and the number of voters is even. Note
thatW is strong if and only if B is proper; and W is proper if and only if B is strong.
In models with a ¯nite number n of voters, majority rule with n odd and dictatorship
(i.e., W = fS 2§ : !0 2 Sg for some !0 2 -) are examples of proper, strong simple games.
If ¸ is non-atomic, however, then majority rule is not strong and dictatorship is not proper.
One way to see this is to note that both simple games are open from below, while majority
rule is proper and dictatorship is strong, so the claim follows from Proposition 10. It is also
straightforward to verify directly. In the case of majority rule, by Lyapunov's Convexity
Theorem (Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem 12.33), there exists a coalition S 2 §
such that ¸(S) = 1=2, so that S; Sc 2 B, so majority rule is not strong. Dictatorship is
not even a well-de¯ned simple game when f!0g has ¸-measure zero, as the empty set would
then also be winning, contrary to our de¯nition. There is an interesting alternative to pure
dictatorship: de¯ne W to consist of the coalitions containing an open set around !0. As
long as ¸ has a positive density, so that every open set has positive ¸-measure, this simple
game is proper. Moreover, given any continuous pro¯le ½, voter !0 is, in fact, a dictator:
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if a¼(!0)b, then, by continuity, an open set around !0 will share that strict preference, so
aP b. The collection of winning coalitions in the latter example is still not strong, however.
Do proper, strong simple games exist when the electorate is a continuum and voters are
continuously distributed? As the next proposition shows, the answer is a±rmative. In fact,
we prove the existence of a proper and strong simple game such that, for every S; T 2 W,
we have S \ T 2 W.12
Proposition 11 There exists W that is proper and strong and such that, for all S;T 2 W,
S \T 2 W.
Proof: We call F µ § a measurable ¯lter if (i) - 2 F, (ii) ; =2 F, (iii) for all S 2 F and
all T 2§, ¸(S n T) = 0 implies T 2 F, and (iv) for all S;T 2 F, S \ T 2 F. Let F be the
collection of all measurable ¯lters. We claim there is a maximal element F¤ in F. To see
this, ¯rst note that
fS 2 § : ¸(S) = 1g 2 F;
so the collection is nonempty. Take any ¶-chain C of measurable ¯lters, and note that SC
is itself a measurable ¯lter. Thus, existence of F¤ follows from Zorn's lemma. Now we claim
that F¤ is strong, in the sense that, for all S 2§, either S 2 F¤ or Sc 2 F¤. Suppose not,
and de¯ne
FS = fT 2§ : T 2 F¤ or ¸((V \ S) n T) = 0 for some V 2 F¤g:
Note the following properties of this collection.
1. - 2 FS.
This is obvious.
2. For all S0 2FS and all T 0 2 §, ¸(S0 nT 0) = 0 implies T 0 2 FS.
Take any S0 2 FS and T 0 2 § such that ¸(S0 n T 0) = 0. If S0 2 F¤, then T 0 2 F¤
follows, so T 0 2 FS. Otherwise, there exists V 2 F¤ such that ¸((V \ S) n S0) = 0. Then
¸((V \ S) nT 0) = 0, so T 0 2 FS.
3. For all S0; T 0 2 FS, S0 \ T 0 2 FS .
Take any S0; T 0 2 FS. If both coalitions are in F¤, then S0 \ T 0 2 F¤, so S0 \ T 0 2 FS.
If S0 2 F¤ and T 0 =2 F¤, then there exists V 2 F¤ such that ¸((V \ S) n T 0) = 0. Then
S0 \V 2F¤, and ¸((S0\V \ S) n(S0\T 0)) = 0, so S0 \T 0 2 FS. If S0; T 0 =2 F¤, then there
12Technically, the simple game we establish di®ers from an ultra l¯ter in that S 2 W or Sc 2 W applies
only to measurable sets S. Our simple game is necessarily \free," in the sense that
TW = ;, when ¸ is
non-atomic.
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exist V;W 2F¤ such that ¸((V \ S)n S0) = ¸((W \ S) n T 0) = 0. Then V \W 2 F¤, and
¸((V \W \ S) n (S0 \ T 0)) = 0, so S0 \ T 0 2 FS. Of course, conditions 1¡ 3 hold for
FSc = fT 2 § : T 2 F¤ or ¸((V \ Sc) nT ) = 0 for some V 2 F¤g
as well. Finally, suppose ; 2 FS \ FSc . Since ; 2 FS n F¤, there exists V 2 F¤ such
that ¸((V \ S) n ;) = 0, i.e., ¸(V ) = ¸(V \ Sc). Similarly, there exists W 2 F¤ such that
¸(W) = ¸(W\S). Then ¸(V \W ) = 0, but V \W 2F¤, so ; 2 F¤, a contradiction. There-
fore, assume without loss of generality that ; =2 FS, which implies FS 2 F, contradicting
maximality of F¤. Therefore, F¤ is strong, and we may setW = F¤.
As we formalize at the end of the next section, proper and strong simple games are
\rare" when the preferences of voters are su±ciently heterogeneous: such simple games are
inconsistent with a fundamental continuity property of social preferences.
4 Social Preferences
Given an electorate and a simple game, social preferences over the set A of alternativse are
















That is, aPb if and only if the set of voters who strictly prefer a to b is a winning coalition.
Equivalently, aRb if and only if the set of voters who strictly prefer a to b is not a winning
coalition, and by duality, this is equivalent to aRb if and only if the set of voters who weakly
prefer a to b is blocking. Note that ; =2 W implies that P is irre°exive, and - 2 B implies
R is re°exive.
The next proposition gives weak conditions under which weak social preference R is
complete and strict social preference P is the asymmetric part of R, i.e., aPb if and only if
aRb and not bRa.
Proposition 12 Assume A is Hausdor® and locally compact. If W is proper, then R is
complete and P is the asymmetric part of R.
Proof: Take any a;b 2 A, and suppose that neither aRb nor bRa. Then, by de¯nition,
S = f! 2- : a½(!)bg =2 B and T = f! 2 - : b½(!)ag =2 B. Since A is Hausdor® and locally
compact, it follows from Aliprantis and Border's (1999) Theorem 2.63 that fR 2 R : aRbg
and fR 2 R : bRag are measurable. Since ½ is measurable, S and T are measurable, and,
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therefore, we have Sc;T c 2 §. Then, by de¯nition, we have Sc;T c 2 W. But since each
¼(!) is asymmetric, it follows that Sc and Tc are disjoint, contradicting the assumption
that W is proper. Thus, R is complete. That P is the asymmetric part then follows by
construction.
Our main objective in this section is to give primitive conditions on the underlying
electorate su±cient for the continuity properties of preferences used in Section 2, as well as
for the \thin indi®erence" properties of Propositions 6 and 7. Our ¯rst result, on continuity
of social preferences, is proved by McKelvey (1986) in his Lemma 2 for a ¯nite number of
voters: we extend the result to general electorates under our weakest continuity condition
for simple games.13
Proposition 13 Assume A is ¯rst countable. IfW is open from below, then P is open and
R is closed.
Proof: Suppose aP b, or equivalently, (a;b) 2 P . Thus, there exists S 2 W such that
(a;b) 2 T!2S ¼(!). Let fGng be a countable neighborhood base of (a; b) in A £A, and
assume without loss of generality that it is decreasing. Since ½(!) is closed for each !, ¼(!)
is open for each !. Therefore, letting Sn = f! 2 S : Gn µ ¼(!)g, we have Sn " S. SinceW
is open from below, there exists m such that, for all n ¸ m, Sn 2 W. Therefore, Gn µ P
for high enough n, so P is open. That R is closed then follows by de¯nition.
From Proposition 8, it follows that P is open and R is closed if B is closed from above.
If A is a compact Hausdor® space, then it follows that R(¢) is upper hemicontinuous as
a correspondence. Though Proposition 13 yields openness of P; it cannot in general be
simultaneously be applied to
S
S2BPS, the social preference generated by blocking coalitions:
Proposition 10 has shown that, with a continuum of voters,W and B cannot both be open
from below. We can, however, derive continuity properties of strict social preferences in
simple games that are not open from below, if we impose topological conditions on the
electorate and a condition restricting shared weak preferences across voters. Assuming -
is a topological space, we denote by S¤ the support of ,¸ i.e., the smallest closed set with
¸-measure one.
De¯nition 3 Limited shared weak preference (LSWP) holds if, for all a;b 2 A with a6= b,
and for all S 2§, aRSb implies a 2 PT (b) n fag, where T = S \ S¤.
Thus, if every member of S weakly prefers a to b 6= a, then we can approximate a
by alternatives strictly preferred to b by ¸-almost every member of S. One condition
13Shepsle and Weingast (1984) use McKelvey's result, but they consider \relative" majority rule (a is
majority-preferred to b if and only if more voters strictly prefer a to b than prefer b to a), which does not
possess this continuity property. Their results go through for \simple" majority rule, as de¯ned in this
paper.
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su±cient for LSWP is evident. Assuming A is a vector space, we say voter !'s preferences
are strictly convex if, for all a 2 A, all b 2 ½(!)(a) n fag, and all ® 2 (0;1), we have
®a+ (1¡ ®)b 2 ¼(!)(a). LSWP holds if ¸ puts measure one on some closed subset of the
voters with strictly convex preferences. Banks and Duggan (1999,2000) give a number of
examples of other environments satisfying LSWP in the ¯nite-voter framework, including
divide-the-dollar environments, private good economies, and mixed economies. As discussed
in these papers, strict convexity does not hold in these environments, so that LSWP o®ers
considerably more generality than the stronger condition. Note that LSWP implies that A
is in¯nite | in fact, it is inconsistent with the discrete topology.
The next result is stated for an arbitrary simple game S. Under the assumptions of
the lemma, Proposition 13 already shows that P is open, giving us lower hemicontinuity of
strict social preferences, but the lemma also applies when S = B.
Lemma 4 Assume A is Hausdor®, second countable, and locally compact; - is a compact
topological space and ½ is continuous; and LSWP holds. Let S be an arbitrary simple game.
Then
S
S2S PS(¢) is lower hemicontinuous as a correspondence.
Lower hemicontinuity of weak social preferences, critical for the nonemptiness of the
undominated set, holds under the conditions of Lemma 4. Since those conditions are satis-
¯ed if the set of voters is ¯nite with strictly convex preferences, the next result generalizes
McKelvey's (1986) Lemma 4.
Proposition 14 Assume A is Hausdor®, second countable, and locally compact; - is a
compact topological space and ½ is continuous; and LSWP holds. Then P (¢) and R(¢) are
lower hemicontinuous as correspondences.
Proof: Lower hemicontinuity of P (¢) follows directly from Lemma 4 by setting S = W.
Now take any a 2 A and any b 2 R(a). If b6= a, let S 2 B be such that b 2 RS(a). By
LSWP, there exists a sequence fcng in PT (a) such that cn ! b, where T = S \ S¤ 2 B.
Thus, b 2 PT (a) [ fag. Since b 2R(a) was arbitrary, we have
fag[ [
S2B
PS(a) µ R(a) µ fag[
[
S2B




The correspondence de¯ned by a7! fag is clearly lower hemicontinuous, as is SS2B PS(¢),
by Lemma 4. The union of these two correspondences is lower hemicontinuous, so R(¢)
di®ers from a lower hemicontinuous correspondence only at points of closure, implying that
it is lower hemicontinuous.
The next result gives conditions under which upper sections of R are compact. The
assumptions on the set of alternatives are satis¯ed if A is compact or if all voters have
compact weak upper sections and A is a subset of ¯nite-dimensional Euclidean space. More
precise su±cient conditions follow the proposition.
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Proposition 15 Assume A is ¯rst countable; for all a 2 A and all ² > 0, there exists a
compact set Y² µA such that ¸(f! 2 - : ½(!)(a) µ Y²g) > 1¡²; andW is open from below.
Then, for all a 2A, R(a) is compact.
Proof: Let fY1=ng be a sequence of compact sets as in the assumption of the proposition,
and without loss of generaliy assume the sequence is increasing. Take any a 2 A, and
suppose that, for each n, there exists an 2 R(a) nY1=n. Let Sn satisfy Sn 2 B and, for all
! 2 Sn, an½(!)a. Note that Sn µ Tn = f! 2 - : ½(!)(a)6µ Y1=ng, implying Tn 2 B, for all
n. Note also that fTng is a decreasing sequence and that ¸(Tn) · 1=n for each n. SinceW
is open from below, it follows from Proposition 8 that B is closed from above, implying that
T =
T
n=1 Tn 2 B. But ¸(T ) = 0, implying ; 2 B, which implies - =2 W, a contradiction.
Therefore, R(a) µ Y1=n for some n. Since R(a) is closed, by Proposition 13, it follows that
R(a) is compact.
The next proposition shows that compactness of voters' weak upper sections is essentially
su±cient for the condition of Proposition 15, even in quite general spaces.
Proposition 16 Assume A is Hausdor®, second countable, and locally compact; and, for
all a 2 A, ¸(f! 2 - : ½(!)(a) is compactg) = 1. Then, for all a 2 A and all ² > 0, there
exists a compact set Y² µA su
Now let Y be a compact subset of A. Suppose that, for every Yn µ A, there exists
bn 2 R(Y ) n Yn. For each n, let an 2 Y satisfy bn 2 R(an). Since Y is compact, we





m=n Sm be the limsup of this sequence. Since W is liminf-open, it follows
from Proposition 8 that B is limsup-closed, so S 2 B. By assumption, S0 = f! 2 - :
½(!)(an) is compact for all ng satis¯es ¸(S0) = 1, so that T = S \ S0 2 B. Suppose that
¸(T) > 0, and let ² = ¸(T ). From Proposition 9, it follows thatW is open from below, and
Proposition 16 then yields a compact set Y² such that ¸(f! 2 - : ½(!)(a) µ Y²g) > 1¡ ².
Take any ! 2 T , so that ! belongs to in¯nitely many Sn. Consider the subsequence, still
indexed by n for convenience, such that ! 2 Sn for all n. Suppose ½(!)(a) µ Y². By
Debreu's (1964) Proposition 3, there is a continuous utility representation u:A ! < of
½(!). Choosing n high enough that Y² µ Yn, note that bn =2 Yn implies bn =2 Y², which
implies bn =2 ½(!)(a). Thus, u(a) > u(bn) ¸ u(an) for su±ciently high n. By continuity,
u(an)! u(a). Choosing any n satisfying u(a) > u(an), we therefore have u(bn0) ¸ u(an),
i.e., bn0 2 ½(!)(an), for in¯nitely many n0. But ½(!)(an) is compact, and so ½(!)(an) µ Ym
for somem. By construction, we must have bn0 =2 Ym for all n0 ¸ m, implying bn0 =2 ½(!)(an)
for all n0 ¸ m, a contradiction. Therefore, we have ½(!)(a)6µ Y² for all ! 2 T. But since
¸(T) ¸ ², we conclude that ¸(f! 2 - : ½(!)(a) µ Y²g) · 1¡ ², a contradiction. Therefore,
¸(T) = 0, and we conclude that ; 2 B, which implies - =2 W, a contradiction.
Contrary to our initial supposition, there must exist n such that R(Y ) µ Yn. By
Proposition 13, R is closed, so the correspondenceR(¢): Y !! Yn, with domain restricted to
Y and range restricted to Yn, is then a closed correspondence with compact Hausdor® range
space. It is therefore upper hemicontinuous (Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem 16.12),
and R(Y ), as the image of a compact set under an upper hemicontinuous correspondence,
is compact (Aliprantis and Border (1999), Lemma 16.8).
We next turn to conditions under which social indi®erence curves are thin, i.e., R(a) =
P(a) [ fag for all a. An easily veri¯ed su±cient condition is that W is strong and all but
a ¸-measure zero set of voters have anti-symmetric weak preferences, meaning that a½(!)b
and b½(!)a imply a = b. These assumptions are met when there is a ¯nite, odd number of
voters,W is majority rule, and voter preferences are linear orders. While these assumptions
may be reasonable when the set of alternatives is ¯nite, the assumption of no-indi®erence
is quite restrictive when A is in¯nite. We seek a condition that is more intuitive than anti-
symmetry, in combination with the assumption of a continuum of voters. We use a lemma
that gives conditions under which PS (a) is open for all compact coalitions S.
Lemma 5 Assume A is Hausdor®, second countable, and locally compact; - is a topological
space; and ½ is continuous. Let S 2§ be compact. Then PS is open.
The next condition formalizes the notion that the preferences of voters are widely dis-
tributed.
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De¯nition 4 Dispersion holds if, for all distinct a;b 2 A, for all c 2 A n fa;bg, and for
every neighborhood G of c, there exists d 2 G such that ¸(f! 2 -: d¼(!)a¼(!)bg) > 0.
Dispersion is satis¯ed, for example, if voter preferences are Euclidean with ideal points
distributed over Euclidean space by a strictly positive density. In that case, take any distinct
a; b 2 A, and take any other c. Given any neighborhood G of c, we can ¯nd d 2 G such
that a; b;d are not collinear. Then there exists e such that jje¡ djj < jje ¡ ajj < jje¡ bjj,
and these strict inequalities will hold for some open set around e. The set of voters with
ideal points in this set has positive measure, ful¯lling the condition. The next result shows
that, under weak background conditions, dispersion of preferences is su±cient for thin
social indi®erence curves, i.e., R(a) = P(a) [ fag for all a 2 A. Thus, our condition acts
much like the assumption that the number of voters is odd, in the ¯nite framework. An
implication is that, under reasonably weak conditions, Proposition 6 yields a simpli¯cation
of the de¯nition of covering in terms of social preferences: for a to cover b, it is necessary
and su±cient that both aP b and P(a) µ P(b). Furthermore, for a to dominate b, it is
necessary and su±cient that P(a) be a proper subset of P(b).
Proposition 18 Assume that A is Hausdor®, second countable, and locally compact; - is
a compact topological space and ½ is continuous; LSWP holds; dispersion holds; and W is
proper, open from below, and semi-strong. Then R(a) = P (a) [ fag for all a 2 A.
Proof: By Proposition 12, becauseW is proper, P is the asymmetric part of R, so P(a)µ
R(a). Then, by Proposition 13, we have P (a) [ fag µ R(a). Now take any b 2 R(a) with
b6= a, so S = f! 2 - : b½(!)ag 2 B. Take any open set G around b. By LSWP, there is a
sequence fcng converging to b such that cn6= b for all n and cn¼(!)a for all ! 2 T, where
T = S \ S¤ 2 B. Take any cn 2 G. Since ½ is continuous, T is closed, in fact compact,
and therefore Lemma 5 implies that PT (a) is open. Thus, G
0 = PT(a) \G is an open set
around cn, so, by dispersion, there exists d 2 G0 such that ¸(f! 2 - : d¼(!)a¼(!)bg) > 0.
Let T 0 = T [ f! 2 - : d¼(!)a¼(!)bg. Since f! 2 - : d¼(!)a¼(!)bg \ T = ;, we have
¸(T 0) > ¸(T ), and our assumption that W is semi-strong implies T 0 2 W. Therefore,
d 2 P(a). Since G was arbitrary, we have b 2 P(a).
Dispersion is also satis¯ed if A is ¯nite and if all linear orders of A are present in the
preferences of the electorate, in the sense that the set of voters with any given ordering has
positive ¸-measure. Because we use LSWP in the above proposition, however, we preclude
the ¯nite A case. This is unavoidable, because we do not assume W is strong: if A has
the discrete topology, if W is majority rule, and if the number of voters is ¯nite and even,
then R(a) = P(a) [ fag= P(a) [ fag will not hold generally, even if voter preferences are
dispersed.
McKelvey's (1986) Lemma 7 establishes that, if - is ¯nite, if voters have strictly convex
preferences over a subset of Euclidean space, and if W is strong, then R(a) = P(a) [ fag
for all a 2 A. The conclusion of Proposition 18 would hold under these assumptions even
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if - and ½ were allowed to be completely general. Proposition 11 establishes the existence
of a strong, proper simple game, so this extension of McKelvey's result is not vacuous. Its
applicability is limited, however, by Proposition 10, which shows that, with a continuum of
voters, W proper and strong is inconsistent with W open from below. The latter is only a
su±cient condition for continuous social preferences, so discontinuities are not necessarily
implied. The following result shows that, indeed, when voters' preferences over a connected
set of alternatives are su±ciently rich, all proper and strong simple games do generate
discontinuous social preferences.
Proposition 19 Assume A is Hausdor®, locally compact, and path-connected; for all a; b 2
A, ¸(f! 2 - : ½(!)(a) = ½(!)(b)g) = 0; and there exists a 2 A with P (a) 6= ; and
P¡1(a)6= ;. If R is closed, then W is not both proper and strong.
Proof: Let bPa and aP c. Let f: [0; 2] ! A be a continuous function satisfying f(0) = a,
f(1) = c, and f(2) = b. Let s = supfx 2 [0;2] : aPf(x)g, and note that 1 · s · 2. By
construction, there exists an increasing sequence frng in [0; 2] such that rn! s and, for all
n, aPf(rn). By Proposition 12 and the assumption thatW is proper, we have aRf(rn) for
all n. By continuity of f , f(rn)! f(s), and, since R is closed, aRf(s). Similarly, we may
take a decreasing sequence ftng in [0;2] such that tn ! s and, for all n, f(tn)Ra. Again,
f(tn)! f(s), and, since R is closed, f(s)Ra. So there exist S;T 2 B such that aRSf(s)
and f(s)RTa. By assumption, S
0 = f! 2 S : a¼(!)f(s)g is ¸-equivalent to S, so S0 2 B,
and similarly T 0 = f! 2 T : f(s)¼(!)ag 2 B. IfW is strong, then B µ W, so S0; T 0 2 W.
But S0 \ T 0 = ;, so W is not proper.
Proposition 6 yields an alternative characterization of covering and dominance under a
di®erent condition on preferences, namely, that R¡1(a) = P¡1(a) [ fag for all a 2 A. This
will hold under McKelvey's (1986) conditions that voters have strictly convex preferences
andW is strong, as long as A is an open subset of <n. To see that openness of A is needed
in the latter claim, consider the following example, in which A is a closed rectangle in <2
with the relative topology, the electorate - = f1;2; 3g consists of three voters, where ¸ is
uniform, voters have indi®erence curves as indicated (we draw \indi®erence curves" outside
A to clarify preferences involving b), and W is majority rule. Then b is socially indi®erent
to a, in particular b 2 R¡1(a), but it is isolated from the alternatives to which a is strictly
socially preferred. Thus, R¡1(a)6= P¡1(a)[fag. To see the consequences for the de¯nition
of covering, note that R(c) µ R(a), yet b 2 P(c) nP (a). Therefore, R(c) µ R(a) does not
imply P(c) µ P (a), contrary to McKelvey's (1986) Proposition 3.3, demonstrating that the
condition in part 2 of Proposition 6 is needed for the result.
For an even simpler example, where voter preferences are convex but not strictly so,
consider the divide-the-dollar model with a ¯nite set of voters: assume - = f!1; : : : ; !ng
consists of an odd number n ¸ 3 voters, where ¸ is uniform; the set of alternatives is
A = fa 2 <n+ :
Pn
i=1ai = 1g, the unit simplex in <n; for each voter !i, ai¼(!i)bi if and




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Violation of McKelvey's implicit assumption
R(a) =A. Note that b = (0; 1n¡1 ; : : : ;
1
n¡1) 2 R¡1(a), but b is isolated from the alternatives
to which a is socially preferred | in fact, P¡1(a) = ;. Thus, R¡1(a)6= P¡1(a)[fag. As a
consequence, letting c = (1; 0; : : : ;0), we have R(c) µR(a) but b 2 P(c) n P(a). Therefore,
R(c) µ R(a) does not imply P (c) µ P (a), creating the possibility of multiple uncovered
sets, noted by Penn (2002) in this model.
As Propositions 10 and 19 show, the assumption that W is strong is quite restric-
tive when there is a continuum of voters. Thus, its usefulness in obtaining the condition
R¡1(a) = P¡1(a) [ fag is limited in our framework. The next result veri¯es that the
assumption that W is strong can be replaced by dispersion of preferences and the much
weaker assumption that W is semi-strong. Recall that the latter condition is satis¯ed, for
example, by majority rule. Under the conditions of Proposition 18 and the following result,
we obtain the alternative characterizations of covering in Proposition 6 and the two-step
principles of Proposition 7.
Proposition 20 Assume A is an open, convex subset of <n with the relative topology; -
is a compact topological space and ½ is continuous; S¤ µ f! 2 - : ½(!) is strictly convexg;
dispersion holds; and W is proper, open from below, and semi-strong. Then R¡1(a) =
P¡1(a) [ fag for all a 2 A.
Proof: By Proposition 12, because W is proper, it follows that P is the asymmetric part
of R, so P¡1(a) µ R¡1(a). Then, by Proposition 13, we have P¡1(a) [ fag µ R¡1(a).
Now take any b 2 R¡1(a) with b6= a, so S = f! 2 - : a½(!)bg 2 B. Take any open set G
around b, and assume without loss of generality that G is convex. Since ½ is continuous, S is
closed. Therefore, T = S\S¤ 2 B is also closed, in fact compact, and Lemma 5 implies that
P¡1T (a) is open. SinceA is open as a subset of <n, there exists a non-empty, convex, open set
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G0 µ<n such that b 2 G0 µA. Let c 2 G\G0 satisfy c = (1¡®)a+®b for some ® > 1. Let
d= (1=2)b+ (1=2)c, which is an element of G\G0. By strict convexity of voter preferences,
therefore, we have a¼(!)d¼(!)c for all ! 2 T . In particular, c; d 2 P¡1T (a). Since a, c, and d
are distinct, dispersion yields e 2G\G0\P¡1T (a) such that ¸(f! 2 - : e¼(!)a¼(!)cg) > 0.
Let T 0 = T [ f! 2 - : e¼(!)b¼(!)cg. Since f! 2 - : e¼(!)a¼(!)cg \ T = ;, we have
¸(T 0) > ¸(T ), and our assumption that W is semi-strong implies T 0 2 W. Therefore,
c 2 P¡1(a) \G. Since G was arbitrary, we have b 2 P¡1(a).
5 Electoral Competition
Given a policy space A and an electorate - with winning coalitions W, consider the com-
petition between two o±ce-motivated parties, where each party strategically chooses its
platform in the set A in order to maximize its chances of winning the election. Precisely,
the two parties play a symmetric, zero-sum game where A is their common set of pure




1 if aP b
¡1 if bPa
0 else,
where here a denotes the platform of party 1 and b the platform of party 2. It is easy to
see that a¤ is an optimal play in this game if and only if a¤ is not defeated by a winning
coalition, i.e., a¤ 2 K. This means that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies is equivalent to the nonemptiness of the core. On the other hand, the set of strategies
obtained after deletion of the weakly dominated strategies is precisely the undominated set.
The uncovered set, which is a superset (sometimes proper) of the undominated set, does
not have a direct game-theoretic interpretation. But as demonstrated by Banks, Duggan,
and Le Breton (2000) for a class of games including the two-party competition game de-
scribed above, the support of every Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies is contained in the
uncovered set.
In this section, we analyze properties of these choice sets as electoral preferences vary.
Fixing the winning coalitions W, we write P [½] and R[½] for the strict and weak social pref-
erences determined by pro¯le ½. We write K [½], UC[½], and UD[½] for the core, uncovered
set, and undominated set of the social preference relations P [½] and R[½]. We extend previ-
ous results on generic emptiness of the core to the general spatial model, and we establish
nonemptiness of the uncovered and undominated sets in the general model. We then show
that the three above correspondences are upper hemicontinuous at pro¯les with a non-empty
and externally stable core. Thus, though small perturbations of preferences may (and usu-
ally will) lead to a non-empty core, this result, with our above observations on electoral
competition, suggests that electoral outcomes will change continuously. Finally, we provide
conditions under which the undominated set correspondence is lower hemicontinuous. Thus,
the uncovered set correspondence contains a lower hemicontinuous correspondence.
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The next lemma on continuity of social preferences is essential to the analysis. Assume
that - is a Polish space, i.e., a complete and separable metric space, and that ¾ is the
corresponding Borel ¾-algebra. Let d be the metric on -. Assuming A is a locally compact
Polish space, the closed convergence topology on R is metrizable (Aliprantis and Border
(1999), Corollary 3.81), and we let ~d denote a metric that generates that topology. Let P





for ½;½0 2P. We will freely identify pro¯les that di®er on a ¸-measure zero set of voters, in
which case we may view ¢ as a metric. We then say a sequence f½ng of pro¯les converges to
pro¯le ½, written ½n ! ½, if ¢(½n; ½)! 0. Under the strongest of our continuity conditions
on simple games, we obtain the following continuity result for social preferences.
Lemma 6 Assume A is a locally compact, complete, separable metric space; - is a complete
and separable metric space; and W is ¸-open. Let ½n ! ½, let an ! a, and let bn ! b. If
anR[½n]bn for all n, then aR[½]b:
When there is a ¯nite number of voters, di®erent formulations of the assertion that the
core is generically empty have been provided. Some authors, in the vein of Plott's (1967)
seminal early contribution, assume that voter preferences are di®erentiable and perhaps
convex. Their results provide characterizations of core points in terms of di®erentiability
properties, which are evidently quite di±cult to satisfy when the dimensionality of the space
of alternatives is su±ciently high (at least two, for the case of majority rule with an odd
number of voters). Other authors do not assume di®erentiability or convexity of voter pref-
erences and prove the generic emptiness of the core directly while imposing only continuity
on voter preferences (Rubinstein (1979), Cox (1984), Le Breton (1987)). In the latter work,
because the space of voter preferences is richer, no dimensionality restrictions are needed.
McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Ungar (1980) have proved that Plott's characterization in terms
of symmetry of voter gradients at core points holds true while allowing for a measure space
of voters. Our next result plays the complementary role for the above-cited literature on
generic emptiness of the core when voter preferences are restricted only by continuity. The
implication for electoral competition is that pure strategy equilibria electoral game will
almost never exist.
When - is ¯nite, we say W is non-collegial if TW = ;. When there is a continuum
of massless voters, however, every simple game is non-collegial according to this de¯nition:
for each ! 2-, -n f!g 2 W, so W has empty intersection. We extend the usual de¯nition
as follows. We say W is non-collegial if, for every S 2 §, there exists a ¯nite measurable
partition, fS1; : : : ;SMg, of S such that, for all m, - n Sm 2 W. Given a non-collegial
simple game, note that, if S 2 § is an atom, then S =2 B. On the other hand, if ¸ is
atomless, then, by Aliprantis and Border's (1999) Theorem 12.34, for all ² > 0, there exists
a ¯nite measurable partition, fS1; : : : ;SMg, of - such that ¸(Sm) < ² for all m. Thus, if
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¸ is atomless and there exists ² > 0 such that ¸(S) > 1¡ ² implies S 2 W, then W is
non-collegial.
Proposition 21 Assume A is a compact and convex subset of some Euclidean space with
jAj > 2; - is a complete and separable metric space; and W is non-collegial and ¸-open.
Then the set
K = f½ 2 P : K[½]6= ;g
is closed and nowhere dense in P in the ¢ metric.
Proof: We ¯rst prove K is closed. Let ½n ! ½ with ½n 2 K for all n. Let an 2 K [½n] for
each n. Since A is compact, there is a subsequence fankg converging to some limit a. Take
any b 2 A and note that ankR[½nk ]b for all k. Then Lemma 6 implies aR[½]b. Since b is
arbitrary here, we have a 2K [½] 6= ;.
To prove that K has empty interior, take ½ 2 K and ² > 0. We will show that there
exists ½² such that ¢(½²; ½) · ² and ½² =2 K. Let c = supf ~d(R;R0) : R;R0 2 Rg, which is
¯nite, since A is compact. From Lusin's Theorem (Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem
10.8), there exists a compact subset Y² of - such that ¸(Y²) ¸ 1¡ (²=2c) and ½, restricted
to Y², is continuous. Since Y² is compact, ½ is uniformly continuous on Y². Let ± > 0 be
such that d(!;!0) · ± implies ~d(½(!); ½(!0)) · ²=2. Letting B±(!) denote the open d-ball
with radius ± centered at !, fB±(!) : ! 2 Y²g is an open cover of Y². By compactness, it
has a ¯nite subcover, say fB1; : : : ; BMg. Let S1 =B1, let




for m = 2; : : : ; M, and let SM+1 = - n Y². The family fSmg is a measurable partition of
-. SinceW is non-collegial, for each m there is a ¯nite partition fSjm : j = 1; : : : ;Jmg such
that, for all j, Sjm =2 B. Now let T be the ¯nite partition
T = fSjm : j = 1; : : : ;Jm;m = 1; : : : ;M + 1g;
and index the elements of T as Ti, i = 1; : : : ; n. For each i, let R0i be an arbitrary element










it follows that ¢(½;½0²) · ²=2.
Now de¯ne a ¯nite simple gameWn on the set f1; : : : ;ng as follows: for S µ f1; : : : ;ng,
let




Thus, by choice of fTig, Wn is non-collegial. Given any ¯nite pro¯le (R1; : : : ;Rn), de¯ne







SinceWn is non-collegial, it follows from Le Breton (1987) that there exists a ¯nite pro¯le
(R1; : : : ; Rn) such that K
n[R1; : : : ;Rn] = ; and ~d(Ri; R0i) · ²=2 for all i = 1; : : : ; n. De¯ne
the pro¯le ½²: -! R by ½²(!) = Ri for all ! 2 Ti and all i = 1; : : : ;n. Clearly, K[½²] =
Kn[R1; : : : ;Rn] = ;, so we have ½² =2K and ¢(½; ½²) · ², as required.
This negative result for pure strategy equilibria leads to interest in alternative solutions
for the electoral game: if parties eliminate weakly dominated strategies, for example, then
they will choose platforms in the undominated set; if parties play mixed strategy equilibria,
then they will choose uncovered platforms. Thus, these choice sets may yield useful bounds
on electoral outcomes. The next results show that, in contrast to the core, the uncovered
and undominated sets are non-empty quite generally.
Proposition 22 Assume A is ¯rst countable; for all a 2 A and all ² > 0, there exists a
compact set Y² such that ¸(f! 2 - : ½(!)(a) µ Y²g) > 1¡ ²; and W is open from below.
Then UC[½]6= ;.
Proof: By Proposition 15, each R[½](a) is compact. By Proposition 13, R[½](b) is closed
for all b 2 A. By Proposition 2, therefore, we have UC [½] = UC(R[½])6= ;.
Nonemptiness of the undominated set and external stability of these sets follow if we
impose topological conditions on the electorate. We write D[½] and C [½] for the dominance
and covering relations determined by R[½] and P [½].
Proposition 23 Assume A is Hausdor®, second countable, and locally compact; - is a
compact topological space and ½ is continuous; LSWP holds at ½; for all a 2 A and all
² > 0, there exists a compact set Y² such that ¸(f! 2 - : ½(!)(a) µ Y²g) > 1¡ ²; andW is
open from below.
1. UD[½] 6= ;.
2. If a =2 UD[½], then there exists b 2UD[½] such that bD[½]a.
3. If a =2 UC [½], then there exists b 2UC[½] such that bC [½]a.
Proof: By Proposition 15, each R[½](a) is compact and therefore closed. By Proposition 14,
R[½](¢) is lower hemicontinuous as a correspondence, and then Proposition 3 yields UD[½] =
UD(R[½])6= ;. External stability of UD[½] and UC [½] then follows from Propositions 4 and
5.
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Of interest, then, is the approximate location of these sets. Miller (1980) and Shepsle and
Weingast (1984) have shown, for the case of tournaments and the spatial model in Euclidean
space, that the uncovered set is contained in the set of Pareto optimal alternatives. The
result follows from the same logic in the general model. Here, given an electorate with
preference pro¯le ½, we de¯ne the Pareto dominance relation, denoted ~P [½], as follows:
a~P [½]b if and only if ¸(f! 2 - : a¼(!)bg) = 1, i.e., almost all voters strictly prefer a to b.
The Pareto optimal alternatives consist of the ~P [½]-maximal elements:
PO[½] = fa 2 A : ~P [½](a) = ;g:
The next result establishes, in the framework of general electorates, that the uncovered set,
and therefore the undominated set, is contained in the Pareto optimals.
Proposition 24 Assume W 6= ;. Then UC [½] µ PO[½].
Proof: Take any a 2 UC [½], and suppose b ~P [½]a for some b 2 A. We claim that bC[½]a.
First, note that there exists S 2 W, and that T = f! 2 S : b¼(!)ag satis¯ es ¸(T) = ¸(S).
Therefore, T 2 W, and bP [½]a. Second, take any c 2 R(b), and consider S 2 B such that
cRSb. De¯ning T = f! 2 S : b¼(!)ag, we have ¸(T ) = ¸(S), so T 2 B. Moreover, since
each ½(!) is a weak order, we have cPSa, which implies c 2 R(a). Therefore, R(b) µR(a).
Finally, take any c 2 P(b), and consider S 2W such that cPSb. Then the argument of the
previous case yields T 2 W such that cPSa, i.e., c 2 P(a). Therefore, P (b)µ P(a), and we
conclude that bC [½]a, a contradiction. Therefore, we have a 2 PO[½], as claimed.
We now examine the continuity properties of the uncovered set correspondence. The
next result demonstrate that, at pro¯les ½ such that K[½] is nonempty and is strongly
externally stable, the correspondence UC[¢] is upper hemicontinuous at ½. It generalizes
Cox's (1987) Theorem 4 in several respects: notably among them, we use a weaker topology
on the space of preference pro¯les, and we drop his \limited asymmetry" assumption. With
the result of Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton (2002) that the support of mixed strategy
equilibria of the electoral game lie in the uncovered set, we have upper hemicontinuity of
the mixed strategy equilibrium correspondence whenever the set of pure strategy equilibria
is non-empty, i.e., K [½]6= ;.
Proposition 25 Assume A is a compact metric space; - is a complete and separable metric
space; W is ¸-open; K[½] 6= ;; and, for all a 2 K[½] and all b =2 K[½], aP [½]b. Then
UC[½] = UD[½] =K [½] and UC [¢] is upper hemicontinuous at ½.
Proof: That UC [½] = K[½] is immediate. Suppose that UC[¢] is not upper hemicontinuous
at ½, so that there exists an open set V ¶ UC [½] such that, for all open neighborhoods U
of ½, there exists some ½U 2 U such that UC [½U] n V 6= ;. Since the space of pro¯les is
a metric space, we may de¯ne Un as the open ball around ½ with radius 1=n, and we let
½n = ½Un. Of course, f½ng ! ½. For each ½n, let an 2 UC [½n] n V . Since A is compact,
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we may assume with loss of generality that fang converges to some a 2 A nV . Therefore,
a =2 UC [½] = K [½]. By assumption, for any b¤ 2 K [½], we have b¤P [½]a. We claim that
there is some m such that b¤C [½m]am, a contradiction.
By Lemma 6, there exists m such that for all n¸ m, b¤P [½n]an. Suppose that, for all m,
there exists n ¸ m and bn 2 P [½n](b¤)n P [½n](an). Let fbnkg be a subsequence converging
to some b. Since aR[½nk ]bnk for all k, Lemma 6 implies aR[½]b. By our assumption of
external stability, b =2 K[½] and b¤P [½]b. By Lemma 6 again, b¤P [½nk ]bnk for k large enough,
a contradiction. Therefore, there exists m such that, for all n¸ m, P [½n](b¤) µ P [½n](an).
Suppose now that, for all m, there exists n ¸m and cn 2 R[½n](b¤)nR[½n](an). Let fcnkg
be a subsequence converging to some c. By Lemma 6, cR[½]b¤ which implies c 2 K[½] and
cP [½]a. By Lemma 6 again, cnkP [½nk]ank for k large enough, a contradiction. Therefore,
there exists m such that, for all n ¸ m, R[½n](b¤) µ R[½n](an). Therefore, b¤C[½m]am for
high enough, completing the proof.
Conditions for external stability of the core used here are given in Propositions 1 and
18: if a is in the core and R(a) n fag 6= ;, then thin indi®erence would imply P (a) 6= ;, a
contradiction. Indeed, if thin indi®erence is satis¯ ed and the core is non-empty at a pro¯le
½, then the core is a singleton and the core alternative is strictly socially preferred to every
other. In this case, UC[½] is a singleton, and, because the uncovered set is non-empty for
all pro¯les under the assumptions of the proposition, Proposition 25 implies that UC[¢] is
actually continuous at ½.
Now suppose that a countably in¯nite set of voters i = 1; 2; : : : have preferences given
by a continuous mapping r:<k ! R, where A is assumed to be a compact metric space
and <k is a space of preference parameters, denoted °. Here, r(°) is a voter's weak pref-
erence relation at °, with p(°) the corresponding strict preference. Let F be a continuous
distribution over <k satisfying: there exists a¤ 2 A such that, for all b 2 A, we have
¹F (f° : a¤p(°)bg)> 1=2, where ¹F is the Borel probability measure generated by F . Thus,
a¤ would be an externally stable majority core point if the distribution of preferences were
given by F . For example, it may be that A µ <k, each r(°) is Euclidean with ideal point
°, and F has a positive, radially symmetric density f , in which case we may take a¤ to be
the unique median in all directions.14 Suppose that the preferences of voters i = 1; 2; : : :
are drawn independently from the distribution F , and let UC(°1; : : : ; °n) be the uncovered
set generated by majority rule applied to any ¯nite draw of preference parameters. We
claim that, with probability one, UC(°1; : : : ; °n) converges in a strong sense (the Hausdor®
metric) to a¤ as the number of voters goes to in¯nity. This can be proved as follows. Taking
any sequence of draws °1; °2; : : : for which the empirical distribution converges weakly to F ,
Skorokhod's Theorem (see Hildenbrand's (1974) result 37) yields a measure space (-;§;¸)
and measurable mappings Án;Á:-!<k such that (i) for each n, ¸ ±Á¡1n matches the em-
pirical distribution of preference parameters for the electorate of size n, (ii) ¸ ±Á = ¹F , and
14The density f is radially symmetric if there exists x 2 <k such that, for all y 2 <k, f(x+ y) = f(x¡ y).
Then x is a median in all directions.
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(ii) for ¸-almost every !, Án(!) ! Á(!). Therefore, social preferences and the uncovered
set for this electorate at pro¯le ½n = rn ± Án are identical to those of the ¯nite electorate.
Furthermore, a¤ is the core at pro¯le ½ = r ± Á and ¢(½n; ½) ! 0, and convergence of
UC(°1; : : : ; °n) to a
¤ then follows by applying Proposition 25 to the sequence f½ng. By the
Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem (Billingsley (1995), Theorem 20.6), the preceding observations
hold for almost every sequence of parameters, as claimed.
The assumption that A is compact in Proposition 25 is needed, unless voter preferences
are restricted. To see this, suppose X = < and there is just one voter, whose preferences
are represented by the utility function u(a) = ¡jaj. Consider a sequence of preferences
represented by the utility function
un(a) =
(
¡jaj if a · n2
n
2 ¡ 2ja¡nj if a > n2 :
At the original preference relation, the core and uncovered set are f0g, while the core and
uncovered set are fng along the sequence: closed convergence is not strong enough to rule
out such approximations. This example obviously violates convexity of voter preferences.
In fact, the upper hemicontinuity result of Proposition 25 can be proved without com-
pactness of A, if we restrict attention to the space of pro¯les of convex voter preferences.
The proof of the proposition, with that restriction, is easily modi¯ed using the following
lemma, which provides a compact bound on the uncovered set in a neighborhood of pro¯les
of convex voter preferences. We omit the statement and proof of this variant of Proposition
25. When A is a subset of a vector space, we let Pc denote the set of pro¯les ½ such that
¸(f! 2- : ½(!) is convexg) = 1.
Lemma 7 Assume A is a convex subset of <n with the relative topology; - is a complete
and separable metric space; for all a 2 A, ¸(f! 2 - : ½(!)(a) is compactg) = 1; and W
is proper and ¸-open. Let ½ 2 Pc. There exists an open subset U µ P with ½ 2 U and a
compact subset Y µ A such that, for all ½0 2U \Pc, UC [½0] µ Y .
Proposition 25 states that upper hemicontinuity of UC[¢] holds at ½ whenever, among
other things, the core at ½ is non-empty. The correspondence UC [¢] is not generally upper
hemicontinuous when the core is empty, as demonstrated by the following example. Let
A be a rectangle in <2, as in Figure 2; let - = f1;2;3g, where ¸ is uniform; assume
preferences (R1; R2; R3) are strictly convex, with indi®erence contours depicted in Figure
2; and assume W is majority rule. For this electorate, aCb and b =2 UC. Now perturb
preferences as depicted in Figure 3. One can check that, for arbitrarily small perturbations,
b is uncovered, violating upper hemicontinuity.
Finally, we turn to lower hemicontinuity of the undominated set. For the next proposi-
tion, assume - is a topological space, and let P¤ be the subset of pro¯les ½ such that
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Figure 3: Alternative b is uncovered
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² for all a 2 A, ¸(f! 2- : ½(!)(a) is compactg) = 1,
² ¸(f! 2 - : ½(!) is convexg) = 1,
² LSWP holds at ½,
² for all a 2 A, R[½](a) = P [½](a) [ fag,
² for all a 2 A, R¡1[½](a) = P¡1[½](a) [ fag,
² for all a; b 2 A, if P [½](a) = P [½](b) and R[½](a) = R[½](b), then a = b.
Note that Proposition 18 gives su±cient conditions, involving dispersion of voter preferences,
for the ¯fth requirement above, and Proposition 20 gives su±cient conditions for the sixth.
While we do not give su±cient conditions for the last requirement, we conjecture that it is
fairly unrestrictive in multidimensional spaces. Thus, P¤ should not be too \sparse."15
Proposition 26 Assume A is a convex subset of <n with the relative topology; - is a
compact metric space; and W is proper and ¸-open. Then UD[¢] is lower hemicontinuous
on P¤.
The proof of this result is contained in the appendix. As a metric space, the set of
alternatives in the last proposition is paracompact (Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem
2.86), so Michael's Selection Theorem (Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem 16.61) yields
a continuous selection from the correspondence with values equal to the closed, convex hull
of UD[½]. Thus, the closed, convex hull of UC[½] also admits a continuous selection. Such a
selection result may be of interest if this correspondence is being used to predict outcomes
in the second stage of a decision process: it may be, for example, that party members
nominate candidates based on outcomes in a later general election stage, and that they use
the closed, convex hull of the uncovered set as a solution for the second stage. In such
examples, the existence of a continuous selection would be desirable for analyzing equilibria
in the ¯rst stage.
If voters in the ¯rst stage have probabilistic beliefs about second-stage outcomes, then
it may be appropriate to use the set of probability measures over undominated alternatives
as a solution for the second stage, in which case convexity is automatic. Let UD¤[½] denote
the closure of the set of Borel probability measures ¹ on A such that ¹(UD[½]) = 1. If
UD[¢] is lower hemicontinuous, then, with the weak* topology on the space of probability
measures, UD¤[¢] is also lower hemicontinuous. The latter correspondence clearly has closed,
convex values. While the space of probability measures is not a Banach space, so Michael's
Selection Theorem cannot be applied, the selection result relies only on a metric vector space
15The last restriction in the de¯nition of P¤ is not vacuous, however. It is violated for majority rule with
an odd number of voters with Euclidean preferences that admit a nonempty core: then majority preferences
are transitive and coincide with the core voter's. We suspect that violations of our condition, as with this
example, are non-generic in multiple dimensions.
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structure, local convexity, and completeness. By Repov·s and Semenov's (1998) Theorem
(1.5)*, the \probabilistic undominated set" UD¤[¢] does indeed have a continuous selection,
as would the \probabilistic" version of the uncovered set.
A Appendix
A.1 Maximal Elements
Given a set X, with elements x, y, z, etc., a relation Q is a preorder if it is re°exive and
transitive. An element x is Q-maximal in Y µX if x 2 Y and, for all y 2 Y , yQx implies
xQy. We say x is Q-maximal if it is Q-maximal in X . As above, de¯ne the upper and lower
sections of Q as
Q(x) = fy 2 X : yQxg
Q¡1(x) = fy 2 X : xQyg;
respectively. We say Q is upper semicontinuous if Q(x) is closed for all x. An implication
of the next proposition is that, under weak conditions, the set of Q-maximal elements is
non-empty and externally stable.
Proposition A1 If Q is transitive and upper semicontinuous, and if Q(x) is compact for
some x, then Q(x) contains a Q-maximal element.
Proof: Take any Q-chain, E, in Q(x). By transitivity and upper semiconintuity, fQ(y) :
y 2 Eg is a collection of compact sets with the ¯nite intersection property, so there exists
z 2 Ty2EQ(y). Thus, z is a Q-upper bound for E. By Zorn's lemma, Q has a maximal
element, say x¤, in Q(x). If x¤ is not maximal in X, then there exists w 2 X such that
wQx¤ and not x¤Qw. By transitivity, wQx¤Qy implies w 2 Q(y), a contradiction.
If we strengthen our compactness assumption in Proposition A1, we can deduce the
external stability of the Q-maximal elements.
Proposition A2 Assume Q is transitive and upper semicontinuous, and Q(x) is compact
for all x. If x is not Q-maximal, then there exists Q-maximal x¤ such that x¤Qx and not
xQx¤.
Proof: Take any x that is not Q-maximal. Since Q(x) is compact, it contains a Q-maximal
element, say x¤. Thus, x¤Qx. Suppose xQx¤. Since x is not Q-maximal, there exists y such
that yQx and not xQy. By transitivity, yQxQx¤ implies yQx¤. Since x¤ is Q-maximal,
x¤Qy. Then, by transitivity, xQx¤Qy implies xQy, a contradiction. Therefore, not xQx¤.
De¯ne the relation Q¤ as follows: xQ¤y if and only if Q(x) µ Q(y). Note that Q¤ is
re°exive and transitive.
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Proposition A3 If Q is upper semicontinuous, and if Q(¢) is lower hemicontinuous as a
correspondence, then Q¤ is upper semicontinuous.
Proof: Take any x and any net fx®g in Q¤(x) converging to some y. Take any z 2 Q(y),
and suppose z =2 Q(x). By upper semicontinuity, G = X n Q(x) is open. Of course,
Q(y) \ G 6= ;. By lower hemicontinuity, there exists ® such that Q(x®) \ G 6= ;, but
then Q(x®) 6µ Q(x), a contradiction. Therefore, z 2 Q(x), and we conclude y 2 Q¤(x), as
desired.
Proposition A3 allows us to quickly deduce an additional result on upper semicontinuity:
ifQ¡1(x) is open for all x, then fy 2 X : x 2 Q(y)g is open for all x, and the correspondence
Q(¢) has open lower sections. It is, therefore, lower hemicontinuous, and Proposition A3
applies.
Proposition A4 If Q¡1(x) is open for all x, then Q¤ is upper semicontinuous.
Let Q denote the set of closed relations on X, endowed with the topology of closed
convergence. Let £ be a topological space, and consider a mapping Q:£!Q, and values
Q[µ]. We say the mapping Q[¢] is outer continuous if, for all nets fµ®g in £ converging to
some µ and f(x®; y®)g inX£X converging to some (x; y), x®Q[µ®]y® for all® implies xQ[µ]y.
Let UQ[µ] denote the Q[µ]-maximal elements. We say the correspondence UQ[¢]:£ !!
X has locally relatively compact range if, for every µ 2 £, there exists an open subset
U µ £ with µ 2 U and a compact subset Y µ X such that, for all µ0 2 U , UQ[µ0] µ Y .
The next proposition provides conditions for lower hemi-continuity of the maximal element
correspondence.
Proposition A5 Assume that, for all µ 2 £, Q[µ] is anti-symmetric, UQ[µ]6= ;, and, for
all x =2 UQ[µ], there exists y 2 UQ[µ] such that yQx; Q[¢] is outer continuous; and UQ[¢]
has locally relatively compact range. Then UQ[¢] is lower hemi-continuous.
Proof: Take any µ 2 £, and let G be any open subset G µ X such that G \ UQ[µ] 6= ;.
Let x 2 G \ UQ[µ]. Let fµ®g be a net converging to µ, and suppose that, for each ®,
UQ[µ®] \ G = ;. Thus, for each ®, x =2 UQ[µ®]. By external stability, there exists y® 2
UQ[µ®] such that y®Q[µ®]x. Moreover, y® =2 G for each ®. Since UQ[¢] has locally relatively
compact range, fy®ghas a convergent subnet with limit, say, y. By outer continuity, yQ[µ]x.
Because y® =2 G for all ®, we have y6= x, and then anti-symmetry implies not xQ[µ]y, which
implies x =2 UQ[µ], a contradiction.
Now consider a mapping R:£!Q with values R[µ]. Following the above convention,
write R[µ](x) for the upper section of R[µ] at x, and say xR¤[µ]y if and only if R[µ](x) µ
R[µ](y). Write xP [µ]y if and only if not xR[µ]y.
Proposition A6 Assume that, for all µ 2 £, R[µ] is complete and, for all x 2 X,
R[µ](x) = P [µ](x) [fxg; and R[¢] is outer continuous. Then R¤[¢] is outer continuous.
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Proof: Take any nets fµ®g converging to µ and f(x®; y®)g converging to (x;y) such that,
for each ®, x®R¤[µ®]y®. Take any z 2 R[µ](x). Suppose z =2 R[µ](y). Then, because R[µ](y)
is closed, G = P¡1[µ](y) is an open set containing z. Case 1: z = x. Since yP [µ]x, outer
continuity implies that, for some subnet, also indexed by ®, y®P [µ®]x®. But, by re°exivity
of R[µ®] and x®R¤[µ®]y®, we have x® 2 R[µ®](x®) µ R[µ®](y®), a contradiction. Case 2:
z6= x. Since z 2 P [µ](x), there exists w 2 P [µ](x) \G, so yP [µ]w. It then follows from
outer continuity that, for some subnet, also indexed by ®, y®P [µ®]w for all ®. Then, by
x®R
¤[µ®]y®, we have x®P [µ®]w for all ®. By completeness of R[µ®], this implies x®R[µ®]w
for all ®, and outer continuity implies xR[µ]w, a contradiction. Therefore, z 2 R[µ](y), and
we conclude that xR¤[µ]y.
A.2 Omitted Proofs of Propositions
We use the terminology and results from the previous subsection to provide proofs for
propositions where they were omitted from the text.
Proposition 2 Assume R(a) is compact for some a 2 A, and R(b) is closed for all b 2 A.
Then UC6= ;.
Proof: Assume R is upper semicontinuous and R(a) compact for some a 2 A, and de¯ne
Q = R \ P ¤, i.e., bQc if and only if b 2 R(c) and P(b) µ P(c). Since R(b) is closed
and P¡1(b) = X n R(b), Proposition A4 implies that P¤ is upper semicontinuous. Since
Q(b) = R(b) \ P¤(b), it follows that Q is upper semicontinuous, and, by irre°exivity of
P , it is transitive as well. Finally, note that Q(a) = R(a) \ P ¤(a), so Q(a) is compact.
Applying Proposition A1, there exists a Q-maximal element, which must belong to UC(R).
Therefore, UC(R)6= ;.
Proposition 3 Assume R(a) is compact for some a 2 A, R(b) is closed for all b 2 A, and
R(¢) is lower hemicontinuous as a correspondence. Then UD6= ;.
Proof: Assume that R is upper semicontinuous, that R(a) is compact for some a 2 A, and
that, viewed as a correspondence, R(¢) is lower hemicontinuous. By Proposition A4, P¤ is
upper semicontinuous, and, by Proposition A3, R¤ is upper semicontinuous as well. Thus,
P¤ \R¤ is upper semicontinuous and is clearly transitive. Also note that R¤(a) µR(a) by
re°exivity of R, so R¤(a) is compact. Applying Proposition A1 yields a (R¤ \P¤)-maximal
element, which must belong to UD(R). Therefore, UD(R)6= ;.
Proposition 4 Assume R(a) is compact for all a 2 A and R(¢) is lower hemicontinuous
as a correspondence. If a =2UD, then there exists b 2UD such that bDa.
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Proof: Assume R is upper semicontinuous, that R(a) compact for all a 2 A, and that,
viewed as a correspondence, R(¢) is lower hemicontinuous. Note that R¤(a), and therefore
(P ¤ \R¤)(a), is compact for all a 2 A. Take a and b such that aDb, implying a(R¤ \ P¤)b.
By Proposition A2, there exists a (R¤ \ P¤)-maximal element c, therefore belonging to
UD(R), such that c(R¤ \ P ¤)a. Therefore, P (c) µ P(a) µ P(b) and R(c) µ R(a) µ R(b).
Since aDb, we have cDb, and external stability of UD(R) follows.
Proposition 26 Assume A is a convex subset of <n with the relative topology; - is a
compact metric space; and W is proper and ¸-open. Then UD[¢] is lower hemicontinuous
on P¤.
Proof: To use Proposition A6, let £ = P¤: By Proposition 12, since W is proper, it
follows that R[½] is complete. The condition R[½](a) = P [½](a) [ fag for all ½ 2 P¤;
holds by assumption. By Lemma 6, R[¢] is outer continuous on P¤, so, by Proposition
A6, R¤[¢] is outer continuous. To see that R¤[½] is anti-symmetric for all ½ 2 P¤, suppose
aR¤[½]b, i.e., R(a) µ R(b). By assumption, we have R¡1[½](a) = P¡1[½](a) [ fag and
R¡1[½](b) = P¡1[½](b)[fbg. From Lemma 2, this implies P [½](a)[fag=R[½](a)±[fag and
P [½](b)[ fbg= R[½](b)± [fbg, so Lemma 1 yields P [½](a)µ P [½](b). Then our assumptions
on P¤ imply a= b, as claimed. By Proposition 13, R[½] is upper semicontinuous, andR[½](¢)
is lower hemicontinuous by Proposition 14, so Proposition A3 implies that R¤[½] is upper
semicontinuous. Propositions 15 and 16 imply that R[½](a) is compact for all a 2 A, and
since R¤(a)µ R(a), it follows that R¤(a) is compact for all a 2 A. Propositions A1 and A2
then imply non-emptiness and external stability of the R¤[½]-maximal elements, denoted
UR¤[½].
To see that UR¤[¢] has locally relatively compact range, note that, for every ½ 2 P¤,
Lemma 7 yields an open set U µ P¤ with ½ 2 U and a compact set Y such that, for all ½0 2 U,
UC[½0] µ Y . We claim that, for all ½ 2 P¤, UR¤[½] µ UD[½], which implies UR¤[½] µ UC [½].
Take a 2 UR¤[½], and suppose there exists b 2 A such that bD[½]a, i.e., R[½](b) µ R[½](a)
and P [½](b) µ P [½](a), at least one inclusion strict. In fact, because ½ 2 P¤, the ¯rst must
be strict, but then a =2 UR¤[½], a contradiction. Therefore, UR¤[½] µ UD[½], and it follows
that UR¤[¢] has locally relatively compact range. Proposition A5 then implies that UR¤[¢]
is lower hemicontinuous on P¤.
Finally, we claim that UD[½] µ UR¤[½] for all ½ 2 P¤. Suppose a =2 UR¤[½], so there is
some b 2 A such that bR¤[½]a and not aR¤[½]b. Note that b6= a. By de¯nition, R[½](b) µ
R[½](a). By Lemmas 1 and 2, we also have P [½](b) µ P [½](a). At least one inclusion must
be strict, for otherwise ½ 2 P¤ implies a = b. Therefore, bD[½]a, implying a =2 UD[½], a
contradiction. This establishes the claim, and it follows that UD[¢] = UR¤[¢] on P¤. Thus,
UD[¢] is lower hemicontinuous on P¤.
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A.3 Proofs of Lemmas
Lemma 1
1. If R(a) = P(a) [ fag and R(b) = P(b) [ fbg, then P(a)µ P(b) implies R(a) µR(b).
2. If P (a) [ fag=R(a)± [ fag and P(b) [ fbg=R(b)± [fbg, then R(a) µR(b) implies
P(a)µ P(b).
Proof: To prove the ¯rst part of the proposition, suppose P (a) µ P(b). Clearly, P(a) [
fag µ P (b) [ fag. Note that b =2 P(a) by irre°exivity of P , so a 2 R(b). Therefore,
R(a) = P (a) [ fag µ P(b) [ fag µ R(b);
as required. To prove the second part, suppose R(a)µ R(b). Then
P (a) [ fag = R(a)± [fag µ R(b)± [ fa;bg = P(b) [ fag:
Since a =2 P(a) by irre°exivity of P , P(a)µ P(b), as required.
Lemma 2 Assume A is Hausdor®. Then P(a) [ fag = R(a)± [ fag for all a 2 A if and
only if R¡1(a) = P¡1(a) [ fag for all a 2A.
Proof: First assume P(a) [ fag = R(a)± [ fag for all a 2 A. Since A is Hausdor®, the
singleton fag is closed, and since a =2 P(a), by irre°exivity, we see that
P(a) = [P(a)[ fag] n fag = [R(a)± [ fag] n fag
is open: if a =2 R(a)±, then [R(a)± [ fag] n fag = R(a)± is open; if a 2 R(a)±, then
[R(a)±[fag]nfag =R(a)±n fag is the intersection of two open sets and is open. Therefore,
R¡1(a) is closed. Note that b 2 P¡1(a) only if a 2 R(b)±, which implies b 2 R¡1(a). Thus,
P¡1(a) µ R¡1(a). Since R is re°exive and R¡1(a) is closed, we then have P¡1(a) [ fag µ
R¡1(a). Now take any b 2 R¡1(a) such that b6= a. Suppose that b =2 P¡1(a), i.e., b 2 R(a)±.
Since b6= a, we then have b 2 P(a), a contradiction. Therefore, b 2 P¡1(a), as required.
Now assume R¡1(a) = P¡1(a) [ fag for all a 2 A. Since fag is closed, it follows that
R¡1(a) is closed, and therefore P (a) is open. Note that b 2 P(a) implies a 2 P¡1(b) µ
R¡1(b), so b 2 R(a). Thus, P (a) µ R(a). Since P(a) is open, we then have P (a) [ fag µ
R(a)± [ fag. Now take any b 2 R(a)± such that b6= a. Suppose b =2 P(a), i.e., b 2 R¡1(a).
We then have b 2 P¡1(a), contradicting b 2 R(a)±. Therefore, b 2 P(a), as required.
Lemma 3 Assume R is complete and P is asymmetric.
1. If a 2 P2(b), then P(b)6µ P (a) and R(b)6µR(a).
37
2. If P (b)6µ P (a) or R(b)6µR(a), then a 2 R2(b).
3. If R¡1(a) = P¡1(a)[ fag for all a 2A, then a 2 P2(b) if and only if P (b)6µ P(a).
4. If R(a) = P(a) [ fag for all a 2 A, then a 2 P2(b) if and only if R(b)6µR(a).
Proof: To prove the ¯rst part of the lemma, suppose a 2 P2(b), so either aPb or there
exists c 2 A such that aPcP b. In the ¯rst case, b 2 R(b) n R(a). In the second case, by
completeness, we have c 2R(b)nR(a). In both cases, R(b)6µR(a) and, by asymmetry of P ,
P(b)6µ P(a). To prove the second part of the lemma, note that P (b)6µ P(a) means aRcPb
for some c 2 A, and that R(b) 6µ R(a) means aPcRb. In both cases, by completeness,
a 2 R2(b). To prove the third part of the lemma, note that one direction follows from
part 1. For the other direction, suppose P (b) 6µ P (a), so that there exists c 2 A such that
aRcPb. If c = a, then the argument is ¯nished. Otherwise, c 2 P¡1(a). Since c 2 P (b), an
open set, there exists d 2 P¡1(a)\P(b), as required. To prove the fourth part of the lemma,
note that one direction follows from part 1. For the other direction, suppose R(b)6µR(a),
so there exists c 2 A such that aPcRb. If c = b, then the argument is ¯nished. Otherwise,
c 2 P(b). Since c 2 P¡1(a), an open set, there exists d 2 P¡1(a) \ P(b), as required.
Lemma 4 Assume A is Hausdor®, second countable, and locally compact; - is a compact
topological space and ½ is continuous; and LSWP holds. Let S be an arbitrary simple game.
Then
S
S2S PS(¢) is lower hemicontinuous as a correspondence.
Proof: Take any a 2 A and any open set G µ A such that G \ SS2S PS(a) 6= ;, i.e.,
b 2 G \ SS2S PS(a) for some b 2 A. Thus, f! 2 - : b¼(!)ag 2 S, and therefore S =
f! 2 - : b½(!)ag 2 S. Since fR 2 R : bRag is closed in the closed convergence topology,
and since ½ is continuous, it follows that S is closed. Since S¤ has ¸-measure one, T =
S \ S¤ 2 S. Since - is compact, and since S and S¤ are closed, T is compact. By LSWP,
there exists a sequence fcng in PT (a) such that cn ! b. Mas-Colell (1977) establishes
the existence of a jointly continuous function U:R£ A ! < such that, for all R 2 R,
U(R; ¢) is a utility representation of R. By construction, U (½(!); cn) ¡ U(½(!); a) > 0
for all ! 2 T. Since this function is continuous in ! and T is compact, it follows that
min!2T U(½(!); cn) ¡ U (½(!); a) > 0. By continuity, there is an open set Xn µ A with
a 2 Xn such that min!2T U (½(!); cn) ¡ U(½(!); x) > 0 for all x 2 Xn. Picking n high
enough, we have cn 2 G and, by the preceding discussion, cn 2
S
S2S PS (x) for all x 2 Xn,
implying G\SS2S PS (x)6= ; over an open set around a, as required.
Lemma 5 Assume A is Hausdor®, second countable, and locally compact; - is a topological
space; and ½ is continuous. Let S 2§ be compact. Then PS is open.
Proof: Let U:R £A ! < be a jointly continuous function such that, for all R 2 R,
U(R; ¢) is a utility representation of R. Take (a; b) 2 PS , so U(½(!); a) > U(½(!); b) for all
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! 2 S. By continuity and compactness, min!2S U(½(!); a)¡U (½(!); b)> 0. By continuity,
there exists an open set G µ A £A such that min!2SU (½(!); c) ¡ U(½(!); d) > 0 for all
(c; d) 2 G.
Lemma 6 Assume A is a locally compact, complete, separable metric space; - is a complete
and separable metric space; and W is ¸-open. Let ½n ! ½, let an ! a, and let bn ! b. If
anR[½n]bn for all n, then aR[½]b:
Proof: From the Polish version of Lusin's Theorem (Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem
10.8), for all ² > 0, there exists a compact subset Y² of - such that ¸(Y²) ¸ 1¡ ² and the
pro¯le ½, restricted to Y² , is continuous. Since ~d(½n; ½)! 0 in the L1-norm, Aliprantis and
Border's (1999) Theorem 12.6 yields a subsequence f½nkg such that ~d(½nk ; ½)! 0 ¸-almost
surely. Now let U :R£A ! < be a jointly continuous mapping such that, for all R 2 R,
U(R; ¢) is a utility representation of R. For all ! 2- and all k, de¯ne
©ak(!) = U (½nk(!); ank)
©bk(!) = U (½nk(!); bnk)
and
©a(!) = U(½(!); a)
©b(!) = U(½(!); b):
Since U is jointly continuous, we deduce that ©ak ! ©a and ©bk ! ©b ¸-almost surely.
From Egoro®'s Theorem (Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem 9.37), there are compact
subsets Y a² and Y
b
² of - such that
² ¸(Y a² ) ¸ 1¡ ² and ¸(Y b² ) ¸ 1¡ ²
² ©ak ! ©a uniformly on Y a²
² ©bk ! ©b uniformly on Y b² .
Now let S = f! 2 - : b¼(!)ag, and suppose that S 2W. Since - is Polish, Aliprantis and
Border's (1999) Theorem 10.7 implies the existence of a compact subset Y 0² µ S such that
¸(Y 0² ) ¸ ¸(S)¡ ². Let Y 00² = Y² \ Y 0² \ Y a² \ Y b² . Since ¸(Y 00² )¸ ¸(S)¡ 4² and W is ¸-open,
we have Y 00² 2 W for small enough ². Furthermore, since ½ is continuous on Y 00² , it follows
that ©b ¡©a is continuous on Y 00² . And since Y 00² is compact and ©b(!)¡ ©a(!) > 0 for all
! 2 Y 00² , there exists ± > 0 such that,
©b(!)¡ ©a(!) > ± for all ! 2 Y 00² :
But by uniform convergence on Y a² and Y
b











for all ! 2 Y 00² :
Therefore, for k large enough,
©bk(!)¡©ak(!)> 0 for all ! 2 Y 00² :
Since Y 00² 2 W, this implies that, for k large enough, bnkP [½nk ]ank , a contradiction. There-
fore, S =2 W, implying aR[½]b, as required.
Lemma 7 Assume A is a convex subset of <n with the relative topology; - is a complete
and separable metric space; for all a 2 A, ¸(f! 2 - : ½(!)(a) is compactg) = 1; and W
is proper and ¸-open. Let ½ 2 Pc. There exists an open subset U µ P with ½ 2 U and a
compact subset Y µ A such that, for all ½0 2U \Pc, UC [½0] µ Y .
Proof: Take any a 2 A. By Proposition 17, R[½](a) is compact. We use the notation
Br(a) µ N to denote the closed ball of radius r centered at a. Let r1 satisfy R[½](a) µ
Br1(a). By Proposition 17, then Y1 = R[½](B2r1(a)) is also compact. Let r2 satisfy Y1 µ
Br2(a), and de¯ne the compact set Y2 = B2r2(a). Suppose there does not exist an open
subset U of P such that, for all ½0 2 U \Pc, UC [½0] µ Y2. Since the space of pro¯les is a
metric space, we may de¯ne Un as the open ball around ½ with radius 1=n. For each n, let
½n 2 Un \ Pc and bn 2 UC[½n] n Y2. Of course, ½n ! ½. Since W is proper, Proposition
12 implies that P [½n] is asymmetric, and by Proposition 7, there exists cn 2 A satisfying
bnR[½n]cnR[½n]a. In particular, cn 2 R[½n](a).
We claim that, for high enough n, we have cn 2 Y1. If not, then there is a subsequence





so that jjdk ¡ ajj = 2r1 for all k. Let Sk = f! 2 - : cnk½nk(!)ag 2 B be the set of
voters who weakly prefer cnk to a at ½nk , let S
0
k = f! 2 - : ½nk(!) is convexg, and let
Tk = Sk\S0k. By assumption, Tk 2 B. By convexity, we have dk½nk(!)a for all ! 2 Tk, which
implies dkR[½nk ]a. Since dk 2 B2r1(a) for all k, compactness of B2r1(a) yields a convergent
subsequence, also indexed by k, with limit, say, d. By continuity of the Euclidean norm,
we have jjd¡ ajj = 2r1, which implies d =2 Br1(a), which implies d =2 R[½](a). By Lemma
6, however, ½nk ! ½, dk ! d, and dkR[½nk ]a for all k imply that dR[½]a, a contradiction.
Therefore, for high enough n, we have cn 2 Y1.
We now claim that, for high enough n, we also have bn 2 Y2. If not, then there is a
subsequence fbnkg such that bnk =2 Y2 for all k. Assume k su±ciently high that cnk 2 Y1,
and de¯ne ek = cnk + ®k(bnk ¡ cnk), where
®k = maxf® 2 [0; 1] : cnk + ®(bnk ¡ cnk) 2 Y2g:
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Note that this is well-de¯ned, since cnk 2 Y1 µBr2 (a) µ Y2, and note that jjek ¡ ajj = 2r2
for all k. Let Sk = f! 2 - : bnk½nk(!)cnkg 2 B be the set of voters who weakly prefer bnk to
cnk at ½nk ,let S
0
k = f! 2 - : ½nk(!) is convexg, and let Tk = Sk\S0k. By convexity, we have
ek½nk(!)cnk for all ! 2 Tk, which implies dkR[½nk ]cnk . Since (cnk ; ek) 2 Y1 £ Y2 for all k,
there is a convergent subsequence, also indexed by k, with limit, say, (c; e). Then, of course,
c 2 Y1. By continuity of the norm, we have jje¡ajj = 2r2, which implies e =2 Br2(a), which
implies e =2 R[½](B2r1(a)), which implies e =2 R[½](c). By Lemma 6, however, ½nk ! ½,
ek ! e, cnk ! c, and ekR[½nk ]cnk for all k imply that eR[½]c, a contradiction. Therefore,
for high enough n, we have bn 2 Y2, a contradiction. We conclude that there exists an open
subset U of P such that, for all ½0 2 U \Pc, UC [½0] µ Y2.
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